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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Stelarc, the performance artist, has since the middle of the twentieth 
century, harnessed technology to enable an ongoing challenge to the 
physical body. Embracing ever evolving technology, Stelarc provokes the 
art world with a series of works that he claims demonstrate the body as 
limited and obsolete. The body positioned as limited enables Stelarc to 
seek the transcendence of the same body through the use of the 
body/technology symbiosis in the form of medical instruments, 
prosthetics, robotics, virtual reality systems and the Internet. 
Acknowledging that this body/technology symbiosis has brought with it 
changes in embodied and disembodied experiences, this study reclaims 
the “obsolete” body as the lived experiential body by exploring Stelarc’s 
contradictions both in his rhetoric and his performance. The established 
contradictions substantiate the body as corporeal and embodied and as 
necessary to exist in and make sense of our surrounding world.  
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Introduction 
 
What it means to be human is no longer the state of being immersed 
in genetic memory but rather in being reconfigured in the electromagnetic field 
of the circuit (www.stelarc.va.com.au/) 
 
The notion that the body is “obsolete” has, as noted by 
technotheorist and artist Simon Penny, become particularly fashionable in 
current cybercultural circles. Penny explains that “this desire to transcend 
the body via the technology of the day [is] much less futuristic than 
contemporary adherents would imagine”. Penny concludes that this desire 
to transcend the flesh is perhaps the most “consistent and continuous idea 
in Western Philosophy” (1997:31). This thesis aims to research this 
concept of the “obsolete” body and the transcendence of the boundaries 
of the physical body through the use of technology. The work of the 
performance artist Stelarc will be used, among others, to show how 
performance art in the latter part of the twentieth century, has harnessed 
technology to enable an ongoing challenge to the boundaries of the 
physical body by ever evolving technological advancement.   
 
The word ‘transcendence’ is derived from the Latin trānscendere, to 
climb over. Transcendence generally means “to exist beyond (the material 
world)”, but it is also defined as going “above or beyond (a limit, an 
expectation)” (Collins 1991, S.v. “transcendence”). Within the scope of this 
study, the term ‘transcendence’ will primarily refer to the desire to surpass, 
exceed, and reach beyond the boundaries and limitations of the body. 
 
The process of “reaching beyond itself” as the “primary 
phenomenon of life” is advocated by Georg Simmel in “The transcendent 
character of life: 1918” (1971) to show how humans have vastly expanded 
their “sense of the world” through organic and inorganic matter. Showing 
that the physical life is characterised by boundaries and limitations, 
Simmel argues that the human capacity of “sensory imagination and 
calculation” does not simply constrain the human, but allows for the 
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technological extension of some of these corporeal limits. This argument 
suggests that there tends to be a certain relation between people’s 
existing bodily capacities and the projects and the types of physical 
developments planned and achieved by humans (Shilling 2005:176-177). 
Simmel demonstrates this by discussing the expansion of our sensible 
world through the use of the telescope and the microscope. Whereas we 
previously made use of the senses to perceive the world, we now have 
built artificial eyes that enlarge and disclose objects that cannot be 
perceived in our natural perception of space. We have, as established by 
Simmel, transcended the “compass of our natural being in certain 
directions” (Simmel 1971:356) through the use of technology. 
 
The word “technology” is from a Greek term techne that means 
both the activities and skills of a craftsman and art of the mind1. It is 
conventionally understood as referring to the practical application of 
techniques and knowledge to productive processes. Technological 
advances have contributed to the myriad ways in which non-human 
materials have been added onto and placed into the body to monitor, 
repair or replace damaged organs. Advances in transplant surgery, in vitro 
fertilization and genetic engineering have moved technology inwards to 
reconstruct, invade and increasingly dominate the very contents of the 
body (Shilling 2005:173-174). The body modified with the use of 
technology has evolved as the “technologised body”.  
 
Cyberspace is the broad term that refers to computer or 
electronically mediated communications which generate virtual places in 
which information is accessed and people can interact without having to 
be physically co-present with others. Both cyberspace and cyborgs are 
referred to collectively as “cyber-technologies” (Shilling 2005:174). This 
coupling of human and machine has initiated the reconceptualisation of 
humans as cyborgs by theorists such as Donna Haraway. Haraway, in her 
                                            
1 Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The question concerning technology: and other essays. 
Translated by William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row: 12-13.  
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article on technology and feminism, defines a cyborg as a “cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction” (1985:516). The term “cyborg” can 
therefore also be applied to the more prosaic merging of humans and 
technology (Shilling 2005:174), such as the computer. This occurs every 
time we work on our computer or log on to the Internet. It is here “our 
virtual selves come to life through keyboards, screens, wires and 
computers”2 (Shilling 2005:174). Through these technologies, we have 
expanded dualities between the real and the virtual, the body and 
technology as well as the body and the mind.  
 
The continuing fascination with the idea of separating the mind from 
the body is identified by cultural historian N Katherine Hayles. She 
describes how, in the roboticist Hans Moravec’s book Mind children 
(1988)3, Moravec imagines the possibility of downloading human 
consciousness into a computer. Hayles describes how Moravec “invents a 
fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon purees the human brain in a 
kind of cranial liposuction, reading the information in each molecular layer 
as it is stripped away and transferring the information into a computer. At 
the end of the operation, the cranial cavity is empty, and the patient, now 
inhabiting the metallic body of the computer, wakens to find his 
consciousness exactly the same as it was before”. Hayles questions how 
someone of Moravec’s obvious intelligence can believe that the “mind 
could be separated from body” and how anyone could think that 
“consciousness in an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, 
as if it had no connection with embodiment” (Hayles 1999a:1). Hayles 
furthermore explains that in this scenario, Moravec argues that “human 
beings are essentially informational patterns rather than bodily 
presences”, and that “an immaterial essence, which alone comprises the 
individual’s true nature, can be extracted from its material instantiation and 
                                            
2 Shilling cites Jordan, T. 1999. Cyberpower: the culture and politics of cyberspace and 
the Internet. London: Routledge. 
3 Moravec, Hans. 1988. Mind children: the future of robot and human intelligence. 
Cambridge: Harvard University. 
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live free from the body”. Hayles calls this concept “virtuality” which she 
defines as “the cultural perception that material objects are interpenetrated 
by informational patterns”. Noting that this definition plays off a duality – 
materiality on the one hand and information on the other – she also points 
to how this fantasy maps seamlessly onto the more traditional dichotomy 
of spirit and matter. For Moravec, Hayles concludes, the “problem of 
mortality has been rationalized so that it is possible to make steady 
progress toward achieving a solution rather than flailing around in mystical 
nonsense” (Hayles 1999b:69-73). Simon Penny, likewise, confirms how 
Morevec’s idea of human beings living as “immortal disembodied digital 
entities” is similar to the notion of “going to heaven” (1997:31). This digital 
fantasy has, as I will outline, emerged as a cultural construct which, while 
simply restating an existing cultural construction of dualism, has also 
suggested the posthuman. The posthuman, suggested by Hayles, 
“privileges informational patterns over material instantiation …”. It also 
conceives “of the body as the original prosthesis that we learn to 
manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses 
continues a process that began before we were born”. Most importantly in 
the posthuman there are “no essential differences or absolute 
demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, 
cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and 
human goals” (Hayles 1999a:2-3).  
 
The biological organism seen as the body in the Western world is 
an abstract concept that is always culturally constructed as suggested by 
Hayles. The body is the human form seen from the outside, culturally 
constructed and striving to make representations that can stand in for 
bodies in general. By contrast, embodiment is experienced from the 
inside, from the feelings, emotions and sensations that constitute the 
vibrant living textures of our lives. Hayles notes that although a study of 
anatomy written across the centuries confirms that ideas of the body 
change as the culture changes, it is less obvious that our experiences of 
embodiment also change. Our experiences of embodiment, although also 
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culturally constructed, emerge from the complex interactions between 
conscious mind and the physiological structures that have emerged from 
millennia of biological evolution. Living in a technologically engineered and 
information-rich environment therefore, brings with it associated shifts in 
habits, enactments, and perceptions. It brings about changes in the 
experiences that constitute the world we inhabit (Hayles 2004:229-230). 
Stelarc’s work as a performance artist demonstrates these changes that 
emerge when the body interacts with technology.  
 
Chapter One of this thesis will consist of an overview of 
performance art, the role of the body in art and of technology and 
multimedia as factors that contribute towards this study.  This overview will 
present these factors as essential components to Stelarc’s artwork. It will 
also give a historical overview of Stelarc as a performance artist from the 
1960s to the present. At that time, artists began questioning the accepted 
canon of art forms and the historical development of art during that period 
and began to present art as the process of art-making rather than as the 
finished art product. It was a short step from the process of art-making to 
the artist him/herself becoming the direct medium of expression. The 
physical body itself turned into the artwork.  
 
Chapter One will also present a historical overview of the body 
which will present Descartes’ new interpretation of the body. Departing 
from previous traditions, Descartes relegated the body to an autonomous 
entity, and presented the mind and the body as a duality. Defining the 
body as the spatial substance or matter, Descartes defined the mind as 
the thinking substance, the Cogito ergo sum “I am thinking, therefore I 
exist”. This notion of presenting the mind as distinct from the body and the 
abstract as distinct from the material, connects the Cartesian influence to 
the unfolding of the body/technology interrelationship and the influence 
this thought has had on the desire to transcend, alter or leave behind the 
obsolete body via technology as expressed by Stelarc in Chapter Two.  
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In Chapter Two, I will present Stelarc as a performance artist who 
has, throughout his career, consistently responded to evolving technology. 
Stelarc has never deviated from his bold claim that “the body is obsolete” 
and the chronological selection of artworks in this chapter will 
progressively unfold the concepts and performances that enact the 
contemporary dynamics of prosthesis, embodiment and virtual reality 
which have been central to Stelarc’s performance art. Analyzing the 
chronological representation of selected artworks enables me to place the 
technologised body as the source of its own transcendence.   
 
Having acknowledged that evolving technology has brought about 
changes in embodied and disembodied experiences and moved the body 
to incorporate the cyborg and/or the posthuman, my argument in Chapter 
Three, however, claims that the posthuman, no matter how technologised, 
cannot leave behind the physical body in the hope of existing as a 
disembodied entity but has to acknowledge and deal with the body as a 
“lived” experiential body.  
 
This research will use the information found on Stelarc’s personal 
web site, articles extracted through the Internet, and books found in South 
Africa that relate to this study. More immediate resources were 
unavailable due to the ephemeral nature and the distant locations of the 
various performance pieces.  
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Chapter One: Art, technology and the body  
 
In performance art you have to take the physical consequences for your ideas. 
[T]o suspend the body with steel hooks, to extend the body with a third hand: it 
was not enough to speculate. Rather, the approach was to actualize the idea, to 
experience it directly, and then try to articulate what happened  
(Quote by Stelarc in Smith 2005b:215). 
 
1.1 A background to performance art  
Roselee Goldberg in Performance live art 1909 to the present 
(1979), shows that visual artists, despite the emphasis on art as formal 
objects, have been engaged in the performing arts since the beginning of 
the twentieth century. The work of the Futurists, Constructivists, Dadaists 
and Surrealists often found its roots in performance. While attempting to 
resolve problematic issues, the artists took their art ideas to the streets, 
cafés, theatres and galleries. Goldberg noted that while the members of 
such groups were still in their twenties, or early thirties, they tested their 
ideas in performance art, only later expressing them in objects. 
Performance, defying easy definition beyond the simple declaration that it 
is live art by artists, drew freely from any number of references such as 
literature, theatre, drama, music, architecture, poetry, film and fantasy, 
deploying them in any combination (Goldberg 1979:6). 
 
Michael Rush in his chapter titled “Media and Performance” 
describes the canvases dripped and poured on by the American Jackson 
Pollock (Number 1 1950)4, the canvases slashed by Argentinian-born 
Lucio Fontana (Work [Concetto Spaziale])5 and those punctured by 
                                            
4 Jackson Pollock, Number 1, 1950 (Lavender Mist) (1950). Enamel. National Gallery of 
Art, Ailsa Mellon Bruce Fund, 1976.37.1. (NGA: 
http://www.nga.gov/feature/pollock/painting1.shtm) (accessed on 29/12/2008). 
5 Lucio Fontana, Concetto Spaziale (1964-1965). Tempera on canvas, lacquered wood, 
unframed 57.5 x 45 x inches. Inscription: on reverse in black ink TL "L. Fontana". Walker 
Art Center. Accession Number:  1998.113. The technique, which Fontana named 
Spazialismo, was conceived in 1949 when he punctured a thinly painted monochromatic 
canvas with a knife. (Walker Art Centre: http://collections.walkerart.org/item/object/8599) 
(accessed on 29/12/2008). 
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Japanese Shozo Shimamoto (Work [Holes])6, as illustrating the changing 
perception of art. Soon the gestural art of Pollock was extended by a 
worldwide contingent of artists including Allan Kaprow, Yves Klein, Otto 
Muehl, Joseph Beuys and Robert Rauschenberg, into actual 
Performances, Happenings and Events. The social and sexual revolutions 
of the 1960s found expression in art that was directed away from the 
canvas into actions that could simultaneously incorporate the viewer into 
the work of art. For American artists at mid-century, it was a short step 
from action painting to action itself as a form of art (Rush 1999:36). 
 
As early as the 1950s, the gestural art evident in the Jackson 
Pollock’s Action Paintings presented painting as an act rather than a final 
object in contrast to the modernist view of the static nature of art. Pollock, 
who became internationally known through photographs that showed him 
standing above or within his huge canvases performing the act of painting, 
presented art as a performance (Jones 1998:53-55)7. Harold Rosenberg, 
the Modernist critic and writer, called abstract expressionism in 1952 
“American Action Painting” and described the body of the artist, as used 
by Pollock whilst performing, as “action painting”, which he described as 
an act of performance within the “arena” of the canvas. The act of making 
a mark on the canvas through the movement of the body “enacts, 
performs, and makes into representation” the subjectivity of the artist 
(Jones 1998:72). Rosenberg, in a later essay titled “The Mythic Act”, 
refers to the performance quality of Pollock’s work by saying: “From these 
apprehensions of presences and energies in nature Pollock passed into 
union with them through releasing paint in fluids that directly record his 
physical movements” (Jones 1998:74). Jones sums up the transition from 
                                            
6 Shozo Shimamoto, Holes (1954) Ana. Oil on paper, image: 892 x 699 mm support: 
1169 x 912 mm. Tate Collection. Ana TO7898. Holes was made from layers of pasted 
newspapers, painted and pierced. Shimamoto began the series around 1949 or 1950, 
during the post-war American occupation of Japan. (Tate Collection: 
http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?workid=71573&tabview=work) (accessed on 
29/12/2008). 
7 The photographs were taken by Hans Namuth and published in the 1951 issue of Art 
News, together with an essay “Pollock Paints a Picture” written by Robert Goodnough 
describing Pollock’s working process in terms that stress his uniqueness and genius. 
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static to performance art by concluding that in abstract expressionism, the 
artist derived his [sic] subject matter from within, so that painting came to 
be seen as the “unmediated expression of pure intentionality, of the true 
‘self’ of the artist” (Jones 1998:81). Jones says that this proves that “Art 
history’s metaphysical narrative of art making as an act of bodily 
transcendence is thus confirmed” (1998:74). 
  
 The embodied “self” of action painting initiated new versions of 
performance in artists such as Allan Kaprow and Yves Klein who placed 
the viewer as a participant in the performance rather than a passive 
observer (Jones 1998:85). In 1959, Allan Kaprow, a precursor of the 
1960s Happenings, proclaimed that “the line between art and life should 
be kept as fluid, and perhaps indistinct, as possible” (Wegenstein 
2004:206)8. Placing the emphasis on the process of performance rather 
than the finished art product, Kaprow moved his art into real time and 
space in his 18 Happenings in 6 Parts (1959)9. He issued invitations 
inviting the audience to become a part of the “happenings”, 
simultaneously experiencing the different components of the event 
(Goldberg 1979:83)10.  
 
Bernadette Wegenstein describes this concept of the “Happening” 
as leaving “no space between the product, its process of creation, and the 
artist”. She describes how these elements all become one as they fuse 
the self, the process and the artwork (2004:206). The performers of the 
late 1960s and 1970s, whilst rejecting the traditional materials of canvas, 
brush or chisel, and turning to their own bodies as art materials, 
formulated the notion of “conceptual art”. “Conceptual art” formulated as 
“an art of which the material is concepts”, implied the experience of time, 
space and material rather than their representation in the form of 
                                            
8 Wegenstein quotes from Kaprow, A. 1956. Assemblages, Environments and 
Happenings. New York: Harry N. Abrams. 
9 Allan Kaprow, 18 Happenings in 6 Parts (1959). Reuben Gallery, New York. (Goldberg 
1979:83). 
10 A detailed description of the 18 Happenings in 6 Parts is given by Roselee Goldberg in 
Performance: live art 1909 to the present (1979:83).  
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representative objects (Goldberg 1979:98). The body became the direct 
medium of expression and the process became the artwork, making art 
explicitly participational rather than simply viewable, and events, 
happenings and performances became the ideal media with which to 
represent art concepts. 
 
Stelarc was not alone in incorporating the artist’s own body into 
performance art. There were, at the same time, other artists who used the 
body as performance material, such as Vito Acconi, Dennis Opperheim, 
Chris Burden, and Allan Kaprow.  
 
Chris Burden, the Californian artist, began with performances that 
placed him in situations beyond the bounds of normal endurance. His first 
performance Five Day Locker Piece (1971)11 took place while he was still 
a student. In the students’ locker-room at the University of California, 
Irvine in 1971, Burden encased himself in a 60cm x 60cm x 90cm locker 
for five days, his only supplies being a large water bottle, the contents of 
which were piped to him via the locker above. In Venice, California, in the 
same year, Burden asked a friend to shoot him in the left arm, in a work 
entitled Shoot (1971)12. The bullet, fired from fifteen feet away, blew away 
a large piece of flesh instead of grazing his arm as was intended. In 1973, 
Burden’s performance was headlined in the New York Times as: “He Got 
Shot – for His Art”. Despite the general public’s dismay, Burden’s 1970s 
performances centred on individual acts of bodily violence (O’Dell 
1998:1). In Prelude to 220, or 110 (1971)13 Burden had his wrists, neck, 
and legs bolted to a concrete gallery floor with copper bands. Nearby 
were placed two buckets of water with live 110-volt lines submerged in 
them. Had any visitor chosen to spill the water Burden would have been 
electrocuted. Typical of these performances Burden was forcing himself 
                                            
11 Chris Burden, Five Day Locker Piece (1971). 60cm x 60cm x 90cm locker. University 
of California, Irvine. (O’Dell 1998:1). 
12 Chris Burden, Shoot (1971). F Space, Santa Ana, California, (USA). (Media Art Net: 
http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/shoot/) (accessed on 29/12/2008). 
13 Chris Burden, Prelude to 220, or 110  (1971). No gallery reference given. (Media Art 
Net: http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/prelude-to-220/) (accessed on 29/12/2008). 
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and the audience and the sponsoring institution, to face an elemental and 
harrowing reality. Burden’s work exposes real consequences between the 
performer and the audience, or the artist and the art world, or the citizen 
and the government (Carr 1993b:16-18). These painful performances 
were meant to transcend physical reality, in the hope that they would alter 
people’s perception of violence. Even though danger was portrayed on 
canvas or in the theatre, Burden, by involving real danger, aimed to “alter 
the history of representation of such themes for all time” (Goldberg 
1979:103).  
 
These actions, whether they included or excluded a direct 
audience, were evidence of the fact that for some artists, the body was 
now regarded in the same light as the canvas. For these artists, the body 
itself is turned into an artwork and the viewer automatically becomes a 
witness to something that actually happens in real time to the performer 
(Wegenstein 2004:214). An important element of these performances, 
whether in a public or private space, due to their intangibility and therefore 
their doubtful commercial value, was the documentation of these 
performances. The recording of evidence through written text, manifesto, 
media, film or photography became the material evidence of the event 
performed.  
 
Vito Acconci, a New York artist, used his body to act out a poem 
Following Piece as Part of Street Works IV (1969)14. Rather than writing 
the poem, he randomly followed chosen individuals in the street, 
abandoning them once they left the street on entering the building of their 
destination (Goldberg 1979:100). In 1970, Acconci in his performance 
work Trademarks (1970)15, did not create his artwork before a live 
audience. He sat in front of a camera, repeatedly twisting his body 
                                            
14 Vito Acconci. Following Piece as Part of Street Works IV (1969). Sponsored by the 
Architectural League of New York, New York City. (Jones 1998:126). 
15 Vito Acconci, Trademarks (1970). No space reference given, New York City. 
(Artfacts.Net:  http://www.artfacts.net/index.php/pageType/exhibitionInfo/ 
exhibition/22537/lang/1) (accessed on 29/12/2008). 
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enabling himself to bite deeply into his arms, legs and shoulders. The 
artwork was intended to be the documentation of these actions. Covering 
the bite impressions in his skin with printers’ ink, he used the marks to 
stamp various surfaces. In 1972, a published document including text and 
photographs of this work appeared in the Avalanche magazine (O’Dell 
1998:17). Instead of producing a marketable object such as a painting or 
sculpture, the physical process of art-making became the work. The video 
camera became the partner in the performance, representing the 
audience (Rush 1999:48) but at the same time, becoming the means of 
documenting the event by allowing the ongoing experience of the 
performance to a larger audience.  
 
This growing reciprocity between technology and art happened 
because artists became increasingly interested in integrating technology 
into their work challenging the traditional boundary between artwork, 
audience, artist and technology.     
 
1.2 The introduction of technology into art 
The growth of technology began with the Industrial Revolution in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. In the early twentieth century, 
the introduction of electricity as a power source transformed everyday life 
in industrialised countries.  
 
The pace of technological development escalated in the middle and 
late twentieth century with the introduction of nuclear power, computers, 
robots and satellites (Webster’s 1994, S.v. “technology”). In this climate of 
technological development, artists in the genre of Happenings, 
performance art, electronic theatre and interactive installations, became 
increasingly interested in integrating technology into their work. So, while 
technology played a significant role in the twentieth century arts in the 
form of photography, film and video, it was Bell Labs’ scientist Billy Klüver, 
who conceived the notion of collaboration between the artist and the 
engineer. Klüver, together with Robert Rauschenberg and associates 
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pioneered artworks incorporating technology that could not have been 
done without the engineer’s cooperation and creative involvement (Packer 
& Jordan 2001:xxi).  
 
In 1966 Klüver and Rauschenberg, along with Robert Whitman and 
Fred Waldhauer, founded E.A.T. (Experiments in Art and Technology) to 
bring artists and engineers together to create new works (Packer & 
Jordan 2001:xxii). Demonstrating the collaboration between art and 
technology, Rauschenberg and associates developed Nine Evenings: 
Theatre and Engineering (October 1966), a seminal event of performance 
and media which was held at the Sixty-Ninth Regiment Armory, New York. 
As part of this event, Rauschenberg presented Open Score (Bong) 
(1966)16, which involved the projection of the darting movements of a 
tennis match between painter Frank Stella and the professional tennis 
player, Mimi Kanarek, using racquets which were wired for sound. In 
addition, three large screens showed the video projections of infrared 
images of approximately 500 volunteers performing simple gestures in a 
totally dark playing area. These performances showed the artists’ delight 
with the possibilities of the new technology (Rush 1999:37-38). 
 
While technology has been used to develop new artistic media, 
today’s multimedia art is rooted in the computer. Although the first digital 
computers were initially designed as calculating machines, scientists 
since World War II have pursued personal computing and human-
computer interactivity as vehicles for transforming consciousness, 
extending memory, increasing knowledge, amplifying the intellect, and 
enhancing creativity. Only a handful of scientists considered the possibility 
of personal computing for creative purposes by non-specialists. The first 
scientist to seriously think of this potential was Vannevar Bush (Packer & 
Jordan 2001:xvii). As Director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, Bush recorded in his text “As we may think” (published 
16 
 
twice in 1945, in the Atlantic Monthly and Life)17 his vision of how 
technology could lead towards understanding and away from destruction. 
This post-war research was a primary inspiration that led to the 
development of new media, as we know it today (Bush 1945:35).  
 
The advances in both physics and biology since World War II have 
generated a transformation that touches our very existence. Biology and 
medicine have been transformed through new instruments and agents 
such as electron microscopes, mass spectrometers and radioactive 
isotopes. The advances in computing, semiconductors and 
microelectronics have enabled the development of new fields of 
biomedical imaging such as ultrasound, computerised tornography (CT 
and PET scanners), nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and 
endoscopic surgery. These changes in biomedicine have enabled new 
ways of changing and repairing the body, including the transplantations of 
body organs. These new ways of altering and remaking the body through 
genetic engineering, genome mapping, aesthetic surgery and mechanical, 
electronic and biological prosthetics, have contributed to the 
transformation of the notion of the body (Gaggioli, Vettorello & Riva 
2003:76).  
 
Artists and groups of artists are creating works in response to 
recent developments in physics and biology. Gene(sis): Contemporary Art 
Explores Human Genomics (April-August 2002, travelling) organized by 
the Henry Art Gallery, University of Washington, presents works in 
response to recent developments in human genomics (Held 2004:264). 
                                                                                                                       
16 Robert Rauschenberg, Open Score (Bong) from Nine Evenings: Theatre and 
Engineering (1966). Held at the Sixty-Ninth Regiment Armory, New York. (Rush 
1999:37). 
17 “As we may think” was published first shortly before, and then just after, the U.S. 
nuclear attacks on Japan, as is explained by the editor of the text. The blasts that leveled 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were produced by the U.S. military-industrial complex, of which 
Vannevar Bush was a primary organizer, having coordinated the activities of some six 
thousand leading American scientists. The editor explains that within this article Bush 
urges men of science to the task of making more accessible ‘our bewildering store of 
knowledge’ when the fighting has ceased: “For years inventions have extended man’s 
physical powers rather than the powers of his mind”. 
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As part of this exhibition Eduardo Kac presents his GFP Bunny (1999-
present)18 or “Alba” as she is affectionately known. She is a transgenic 
animal, created by splicing the DNA of a Pacific Northwest jellyfish with 
that of an albino rabbit. The result of this combination is that under a 
particular ultraviolet light the albino rabbit glows fluorescent green (Held 
2004:272).  
 
As a collaboration between the fine arts and hard sciences the 
Tissue Culture and Art group consists of artists interested in the 
possibilities that tissue technologies present “as a medium for artistic 
expression” (Clarke 2005:204). Working with Stelarc, they used their 
knowledge in tissue engineering and interest in partial life to assist Stelarc 
in his quest for an extra ear (Clarke 2005:204). 
 
Most of Stelarc’s projects and performances throughout his career 
have required medical and technical advice and assistance. Collaborating 
with professionals such as engineers, programmers, micro-surgery 
instrument makers, doctors and genetic engineers, Stelarc realizes that 
each project he undertakes reaches beyond his own expertise (Smith 
2005b:216) and has therefore consistently aligned his performances with 
available expertise and technology.  
 
1.3 A short history of the body in Western culture  
The body, performed by Stelarc, is central to his artwork, and as 
this study argues, continues to inform the understanding of the body. As 
the body, defined as the physical structure, including the bones, flesh and 
organs of a person, is central to the investigation of this thesis, the 
culturally constructed body will be overviewed because the culturally 
constructed body changes as ideas about culture change.   
                                                                                                                       
 
18 Eduardo Kac, GFP Bunny (1999-present). Photographic documentation of living 
artwork, dimensions variable. Courtesy of Julia Friedman Gallery, Chicago. Photograph 
credit: Chystelle Fontaine (“Held” 2004:272). 
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Dalia Judovitz in her study, The culture of the body: geneaologies 
of modernity (2001), describes the body as being grounded in specific 
historical conditions. In her research, it is clearly outlined that it was Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650) in his anonymously published Discourse on 
method (1637), who represented the body radically differently from the 
publication of Michel de Montaigne’s (1533-1592) Essays (1588).  
 
Montaigne, fifty years before Descartes, conceived the baroque 
body neither as an autonomous object nor as a mere instrument. As 
summarised by Judovitz, in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the 
early part of the seventeenth century, the body’s physiological complexity 
was understood to be governed by the interplay and balance of the four 
humours: blood, phlegm, choler (yellow bile) and melancholy (black bile). 
Because of these humours, the body was understood as flexible and 
transitive, depending on the combinations and particular mixtures of the 
four fluids. The dominance of any particular humour created an imbalance 
that shifted the individual’s complexion from health to disease. In 
Montaigne’s Essays (1588), this humoural conception of the body 
determined its embodied character and reflected its analogical 
relationship to nature, culture and personal desire. To Montaigne, the 
body “like rivers or seas whose borders fluctuate and shift”, was “neither 
bounded nor defined as a fixed, self-enclosed entity” (Judovitz 2001:68).  
 
In contrast to Montaigne’s fluid body, defined as the experiential or 
lived body due to the interplay of the humours, as well as the personal, 
cultural, social and natural forces on the body, Descartes presented a 
radical new interpretation of the body. His Discourse on method (1637) 
marked one of the most significant turning points in the conception of the 
body in the European tradition.   
  
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the French mathematician, 
philosopher and scientist, relegated the body to an autonomous entity. He 
redefined the body in terms of the circulation of blood, the body’s 
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technological resynthesis as a machine, and its philosophical reduction to 
a material thing. Descartes’ definition of the body was based on two newly 
emergent systems of reference: Harvey’s anatomical discovery of the 
circulation of blood, and the belief that the entire material universe could 
be explained in terms of mathematics and physics.  
 
William Harvey (1578-1658), an English physician, described the 
circulation of blood as a self-enclosed system. This system reflected the 
emergence of a new concept of medicine, one which self-regulated the 
body from disease to health, which he described as one that “no longer 
relied on the ‘supposed isomorphism between the cosmic order and the 
equilibrium of the organism’ reflected in nature’s presumed powers to 
correct its own disorders” (Judovitz 2001:69). The circulation of blood 
within the pathways of the arterial-venal system established the body as 
an autonomous system of exchange. Within Harvey’s system, the heart 
emerges as the true sovereign of the body, the guiding principle of life and 
becomes tangible in the form of the pulse. The continuous and circular 
movement of the blood ensures both the preservation and regeneration of 
the body. Descartes’ interest in Harvey’s model of the circulation of the 
blood as a closed and self-regulated system of exchange, enabled 
Descartes to represent the body as a mechanical device: as a machine 
(italics mine) (Judovitz 2001:67-70). 
  
Descartes, as indicated in Webster’s new world encyclopedia 
(1994, S.v. “Descartes”), applied the methods of mathematics to 
metaphysics and science. Descartes also postulated two quite distinct 
substances that make up the human body, one substance defined as the 
spatial substance or matter, and the other substance as the thinking 
substance or mind. This is referred to as the “Cartesian dualism”, the 
mind/body duality. Descartes identified the “thinking thing” (res cogitans) 
or mind, with the human soul or consciousness. He identified the body as 
a physical machine. The body somehow interacting with the soul was 
secondary to and, in principle, separated from the soul (Webster’s 1994, 
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S.v. “Descartes”). This “Cartesian dualism”, which posits the autonomy of 
mind and body as two distinct substances, is highlighted, as cited by 
Jones, by Descartes’ famous comment, from the Discourse on Method 
(1637), that “this me – that is, the soul by which I am what I am – is 
completely distinct from the body: and is even easier to know than is the 
body” (Jones 1998:37). 
 
Judovitz points out that it is only historically later, in the writings of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), the French philosopher, where the 
body is reclaimed as the lived, experiential body (Judovitz 2001:107). 
Merleau-Ponty who grounds his theory in bodily behaviour and in 
perception, argues in his 1945 Phenomenology of perception19, that 
perception is intertwined with bodily awareness and with language. 
Merleau-Ponty observed in his Phenomenology of perception20, that the 
lived body is not discrete from the mind as vessel, but is, in fact, the 
“expressive space” by which we experience the world. Unlike other 
objects in the world, the body cannot be thought of as separate from the 
self, nor does it signify or ”express the modalities of existence in the way 
that stripes indicate rank, or a house-number a house: the sign here does 
not only convey its significance, it is filled with it” (Jones 1998:39). 
Merleau-Ponty explains21: “So I am my body, in so far, at least, as my 
experience goes, and conversely my body is like a life-model, or like a 
preliminary sketch, for my total being”.  
  
This study argues that Descartes and Merleau-Ponty’s notions of the body 
act on the culturally constructed body as presented by Stelarc. The notion 
presented by Descartes allows this study to explore Stelarc’s artworks in 
which he presents the body “obsolete” and transcended. Merleau-Ponty’s 
theory also allows this study to explore the body as the lived experiential  
                                            
19 Judovitz refers to Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phenomenology of perception. Translated 
by Colin Smith 1962. New York: Humanities Press (1962:102). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Simone de Beauvoir footnotes Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception in her 
book The second sex (1953:30). 
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body by presenting Stelarc’s contradictions both in his rhetoric and his 
performance.  
 
1.4 Stelarc the artist: a historical overview 
Stelarc, formerly Stelios Arcadiou was born 19 June 1946, in 
Limassol on the Island of Cyprus. He studied Art and Craft at T.S.T.C., 
and Art and Technology at CAUTECH and M.R.I.T., Melbourne University, 
Australia (Atzori & Woolford 1995, Stelarc 1994).  
  
Stelarc, who positions himself as a performance artist, reveals that 
he had always wanted to be an artist. During his interview with Miss M. 
([S.a.]) he says that at a young age he understood that being an artist was 
to draw realistically. Later in his high school years, he began to place the 
nature of art as being “a strategy for comprehending the world, not merely 
a craft that makes hot-couture [sic] images for museums” (Miss M. [S.a.]). 
 
Although originally trained as a visual artist in the 1960s, the “first 
things” Stelarc says during his interview with Miss M. ([S.a.]), that he 
made in art school, were helmets and goggles, which altered the wearer’s 
binocular perception. Stelarc describes this piece of artwork as “a sensory 
compartment that you plugged your head into,” a “rotating domelike 
structure with flashing lights and electronic sounds” providing a 
“continuous sensorium around your head.” (Miss M. [S.a.]) This artwork 
was designed to alter the perception of the normal humanoid vision (Miss 
M. [S.a.]), a concept which is used throughout Stelarc’s career as the 
relationship between the positioned “obsolete” body and the 
transcendence of this corporeal limited body through technology.  In his 
critical text, Jeremy Drummond cites Stelarc as claiming that, even at that 
early stage in his career, no one understood what he was trying to do, 
therefore he was not allowed to do a fourth year, and did not complete his 
art course ([S.a.]).  
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After leaving the Institute, Stelarc moved to Japan, where he found 
the technological environment in which he could produce his work. He 
taught art and sociology at the Yokohama International School, and 
drawing and sculpture at Ballarat University College. Since the late 1960s, 
he has performed extensively in Japan, Europe, and the USA. Aside from 
traditional venues, his work has been included in a variety of new music 
and dance festivals as well as in experimental theatre. Through the use of 
medical instruments, prosthetics, robotics, virtual reality systems and the 
Internet, Stelarc explores alternate, intimate, and involuntary interfaces 
with the body (Drummond [S.a.]). 
 
1.5 Stelarc’s theories of the “body as obsolete”  
Stelarc, as performance artist, considers the body obsolete in form 
and function (Stelarc 1994). He claims “the body” is propelled by a “desire 
to transcend its evolutionary limitations” (Carr 1993a:12). Coupled with 
technology, Stelarc enacts the vision which international Net enthusiasts 
such as the Extropians22 promise: that soon each one of us will be able to 
transcend the limits imposed on us by our bodies. 
  
Stelarc who has consistently objectified his own body, refers to it in 
performances as “the body” in the third person (Carr 1993a:12). Because 
it is difficult for him to convince others to undergo rather awkward, difficult 
and sometimes painful experiences of his artworks, Stelarc uses his own 
body and intends through his performances “to express an idea with his 
direct experience” (Atzori & Woolford 1995). Brian Massumi, in “The 
Evolutionary Alchemy of Reason” (2005) elaborates on Stelarc’s notion of 
expressing an idea with his direct experience by explaining that with 
Stelarc’s performances, “expression and experience join”, making the 
body an “actual manifestation of a concept” (2005:125). Stelarc as “body” 
artist takes the physical consequences of his ideas. His performances 
                                            
22 The Extropians is an international group of the most extreme Net enthusiasts, whose 
leader Max More founded the Extropean Institute. 
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express both the experience and the concept on which the artwork is 
based directly. Imagination and speculation, to Stelarc, are not enough 
(Smith 2000b:216). His medium is, as Massumi states, his body and his 
ideas (Massumi 2005:125).  
 
 Stelarc has performed a fusion of technology with the body since 
the late 1960s. Bernadette Wegenstein says Stelarc is “probably the 
example of how body discourse in performance art has changed during 
the last thirty to forty years”. In Stelarc’s work, she adds, the transition of 
the body as raw material for artworks has developed from the wounds-
performances through his suspensions with levers and hooks through the 
skin in the 1970s and 1980s to the extended body of the 1990s and into 
the new millennium (Wegenstein 2004:221). Stelarc uses the available 
current technology to perform his artworks and started with mechanical 
technology which made the suspension performances of the 70s and 80s 
possible.  
 
As technology developed in the 1980s, Stelarc extended his 
performances with the use of electronics as seen in his suspension Event 
for Stretched Skin / Third Hand (The Last Suspension) (1988) (fig 6). The 
extension of electronics into information technologies of the 1990s made 
possible performances such as Split Body: Voltage In / Voltage Out 
(1995) (fig 7). With the expansion of information technologies and the 
World Wide Web, Stelarc connected himself into this system to enact 
performances such as Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload 
Performance (1995)23 (fig 8) and Ping Body an Internet Actuated 
Performance (1996) (fig 9 and 10).  
 
The growing developments in the field of physics and biology 
during the second half of the 20th Century made it possible for Stelarc to 
use these developments in the new millennium to actualise performances 
                                            
23 Stelarc, Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance (1995). Telepolis, 
Luxembourg (Stelarc:1994).  
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using biotechnology, for example Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) where 
Stelarc realizes the fusion of technology and the body. In this medium of 
performance art, Stelarc challenges the boundaries of the body by 
changing the body through redesigning its interface (with its environment) 
through the use of the body/technology symbiosis in the form of medical 
instruments, prosthetics, robotics, virtual reality systems and the Internet.      
 
Stelarc as performance artist has for the past 35 years provoked 
the art world and the media with a series of works that he claims 
demonstrate the “body as obsolete”. In his performances, he claims and 
shows the body as both limited and obsolete, and seeks to transcend 
these limitations through technological extensions. Chapter Two will 
analyse a representative chronological selection of these works to show 
that they are all based on extensions of Stelarc’s existing body responding 
to the changes in technology that were available to him as a performance 
artist. 
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Chapter Two: Transcending the “obsolete” body 
 
“Life is from the onset nothing other than a reaching-out-beyond-itself”  
(Simmel 1971:372). 
 
Stelarc, who throughout his career responds to the changes in 
technology, consistently provokes the art world and the world media. He 
draws attention to the symbiotic relationship of technology to the body not 
only through his performances but also by claiming: “The body is 
obsolete” (italics mine). These are the words that confront the viewer on 
entering Stelarc’s official Web site <http://www.stelarc.va.com.au/> which 
maintains his texts and performances as composite works in progress. 
This chapter will analyse a chronological representation of selected art 
works which illustrate the technologised body as the source of its own 
transcendence.  
 
2.1 “The body is obsolete” 
 
In his performances, Stelarc progressively unfolds the concepts 
that demonstrate and emphasise the influence of technology on the reality 
of the body. This progressive unfolding of events illustrates the symbiosis 
of prosthetics, virtual reality and biotechnology on the body. Stelarc, as 
body artist, boldly positions his body as an “obsolete” “object” that needs 
to be altered, extended, and redesigned in order to align itself to the 
technological environment in which it finds itself.  
 
During his interview with Yiannis Melanitis, Stelarc gives the 
reasons why he considers the body obsolete. He explains that if a body’s 
internal temperature varies three or four degrees, its health is at risk, if a 
body loses 10% of its fluid, it dies. The body can only live minutes without 
air, a week without water, and possibly a month without food. In good 
health the body averages 70 years but if already fifty (as Stelarc is), then 
this is “a problem” (Melanitis 1999).  
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On his web site, Stelarc similarly questions the body. He writes 
of the body as neither very efficient nor very durable. He outlines the body 
as a performance which is determined by age, which often malfunctions 
and quickly fatigues. Furthermore, the body is susceptible to disease and 
is finally doomed to a certain death. Stelarc repeatedly amplifies this 
theory of “obsolescence of the body” through his performances by placing 
his body into situations that directly force the body to prove his claim and 
thereby become the manifestation of its own obsolescence. 
 
2.2 Body suspensions / obsolescence performed 
 
The body, male, in his 20s or 30s is hooked up through the flesh 
by 18 metal hooks and left suspended for a time in an unnatural situation. 
Stelarc explains this act of suspension as is illustrated by Event for Lateral 
Suspension (1978) (fig 1) as the fact that “he would be amplifying the 
obsolescence of the body out there, the need for it to burst from its 
biological, cultural and planetary containment …” (Carr 1993a:10).  
   
Stelarc’s first suspensions were done from 1972 with ropes and 
harnesses that rather supported the body than suspended it. He found 
that these became visually cluttered and subsequently introduced the 
notion of piercing the skin in 1976. While saying he knew about the Hindu 
Indian suspension rituals, Stelarc consistently claims that his suspension 
events were not about religion or shamanism and he did not desire to 
make the suspensions an image of levitation. He did not prepare himself 
through chanting, enter into altered states or take any anaesthetics (Atzori 
& Woolford 1995).  
 
In 1987, Fakir Musafar, the only other person doing suspensions 
publicly, criticised Stelarc in an article written by Adam Parfrey in the 
magazine Apocalypse Culture, for limiting the time of a suspension and 
calling it art. Claiming Stelarc was dabbling in “magic technology”, Fakir 
critically claims that “if he hung for a longer length of time, he’d have a 
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mystical experience” (Larratt 2004). Stelarc denied any spiritual 
connotations to his work which he believes places the focus rather on the 
obsolescence of the body. In his work, he places the body as a mortal 
object, yoked to technology in an unnatural situation outside its normal 
functionality in order to experience and explore the outcome. The 
outcome of this is that the suspended technologised body is unable to 
function normally and becomes unable to fulfil its purpose as a bipedal 
human body. This is confirmed by Massumi in his text “The Evolutionary 
Alchemy of Reason”, who said that the “regularized, needful, useful 
actions of the human body all hinge in one way or another on its bipedal 
upright posture, the body’s usual way of counteracting gravity”. Massumi 
explains that “the suspended body is in no position to extend its present 
situation into a logically expressible next step by choosing from a set of 
possible actions. It is not only in a needless and useless condition; it is in 
an utterly dysfunctional one … the body is placed at the limit of its 
functionality” (2005:142).  
 
Never having seen Stelarc suspended in the flesh, my observation 
of images of the suspended body in various situations as illustrated in 
Event for Inclined Suspension (1979) (fig 2) embodies the reality of the act 
in my imagination.  It highlights for me the vulnerability and mortality of the 
body because Stelarc does indeed place his body at the limit of its 
functionality. It becomes utterly dysfunctional, helpless, and at the mercy 
of those who have been recruited to initiate and complete the procedure.  
 
What is obvious in the image of suspension, is the lifting of the skin 
from the body where the hooks pierce the body. Considering the skin as a 
boundary of the body separating the internal viscera from the external 
environment, this deliberate breaking and stretching of that boundary 
becomes a metaphorical act of breaking through boundaries of the body 
through the use of technology. These boundaries are discussed by 
George Simmel in “The transcendent character of life: 1918” (1971). 
Simmel claims that the body as boundary shows the significance of 
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boundaries in our existence which is substantiated by “virtue of the fact 
that we have boundaries everywhere and always, so accordingly we are 
boundaries.” These boundaries, Simmel states, make us aware that every 
thought we have stands between wise and foolish, every deed between a 
greater and a lesser measure of meaning, adequacy, and morality. We 
are constantly orientating ourselves to an “over us” and an “under us”, a 
“more or less”, a “better or worse” (1971:353). Drawing from Simmel’s 
argument, the suspended Stelarc appears as an established boundary 
which is altered by the body-technology interrelationship.  
 
Simmel points out that although a boundary (such as the skin) is 
established, “every single determinate boundary can be stepped over”, 
and every such act “finds or creates a new boundary”. Every boundary is 
indicative of our “position” in the world, and therefore every boundary can 
be altered and breached (Simmel 1971:354). Simmel’s argument 
reinforces my positioning of Stelarc as the unfolding technologised body 
performing the “unified act of life [that] includes both the state of being 
bounded and the transcending of the boundary, despite the fact that this 
seems to present a logical contradiction” (Simmel 1971:356). The 
suspended body as the transcendence of boundaries makes it therefore 
the source of its own transcendence which is confirmed by Simmel who 
says that every limit that is set can be transcended because there exists 
something to transcend (Simmel 1971:358).  
 
Stelarc positions his body as artwork in an unnatural situation, 
outside its normal functionality, yoked to technology to experience and 
discover the outcome. Once an outcome is established, the body is 
suspended, becoming limited and dysfunctional and because all 
boundaries are transcended, it reveals its obsolescence. The duality of 
the boundary which can be breached is established and therefore the 
outcome is ambiguous. This begs the question as to the value of the 
suspended body. In reply, Massumi states: “What is being suspended is 
embodied human possibility” (2005:142).  
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Before I explore these possibilities, I will briefly show how Stelarc 
presents “desire” as the motivational force which is used to initiate 
transcendence. 
 
2.3 Transcendence desired 
When suspensions in the genre of performance art emerged in the 
1970s, the body as artwork was attributed primarily to the male body 
artist. At that time, art presented as a performance was expressed 
through action painters such as Jackson Pollock who confirmed art-
making as an act of bodily transcendence by placing the emphasis on the 
act of art-making rather than on the finished product. The body became 
the direct medium of expression and the means through which to embody 
art concepts.  
 
The suspensions, being mostly quiet events done in remote 
locations or private spaces, reflect the desire to explore the body as 
extended beyond the limitations of itself as boundary. Reaching beyond 
its limits, Stelarc observed that “[his] events are involved with 
transcending normal human parameters, including pain”24 (Jones 
2005:89). As he transcends these parameters, Stelarc achieves the 
“desired” transcended body.  
 
On his web site, Stelarc (1994) describes this experience in Seaside 
Suspension: Event for Wind and Waves (1981) (fig 3): 
The body, parallel to the horizon and looking out to sea, was 
suspended from a wooden structure on an outcrop of rocks near 
the shore as the tide was coming in. The weather was overcast 
with a blustery wind swaying the body and waves crashing against 
the rocks spraying and splashing it. The duration of the 
suspension was approximately 20 minutes. 
                                            
24 Original quote by Stelarc cited in Paffrath, James D & Stelarc (eds). 1984. Obsolete 
body/suspensions/Stelarc. Davis, CA: JP Publications (1984:8). This book is not 
available for loan in South Africa.   
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Stelarc describes this same experience in an interview with Cynthia 
Carr. He explains that during the seaside suspension while facing 
sideways over the incoming tide, he began “to feel that the surface of the 
sea was an extension of his skin stretching out to the horizon then back, a 
membrane that began pulsating and finally bursting in the form of waves” 
(Carr 1993a:12-13).  
  
 Hanging between the branches of a tree, the suspension called 
Prepared Tree Suspension: Event for Obsolete Body, No.6 (1982) (fig 4) 
proves Stelarc’s desire to be extended beyond mere body. Requesting the 
spectators (about 350 - 400) to leave after 15 minutes, Stelarc desired to 
experience the “symbiotic relationship of body and the tree” without being 
distracted by an audience. Stelarc describes the experience of the 
audience by saying that he believed that “[i]t must have been beautiful to 
drive off leaving the body there” (Carr 1993a:11).  
 
 The body will now be presented as the technologised suspended 
body; as artwork that simultaneously enacts both the boundary and its 
own transcendence of that boundary. The body in this artwork becomes 
the source of its own transcendence and what is being suspended is not 
simply the body but the “embodied human possibility”. Despite the fact 
that this seems to present a logical contradiction, it claims the 
technologised body as both limited (bounded) and transcended.  
 
2.4 The “body” as “object” 
In a typical Cartesian manner, Stelarc claims that the body is “an 
impersonal, evolutionary, objective structure” (Atzori & Woolford 1995). 
He refers to his body in the third person as “the body” in order to objectify 
himself so that he is able to dissociate himself from the experience of 
suspension. He explains that “[i]t’s not important that it’s me. It’s important 
that a physical body suspended in space has these experiences” (Carr 
1993a:13). Cynthia Carr of the event Street Suspension (1984) (fig 5) 
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discusses Stelarc’s rhetoric that places “… the body not as a subject but 
as an object …” (Stelarc 2000:562). In her book On edge: performance at 
the end of the twentieth century (1993)25, Carr gives a detailed description 
of how Stelarc turned these suspension performances into carefully 
calculated antiseptic events thereby positioning the body as object rather 
than allowing the performance to become a subjective experience of his 
own body. Carr describes a bowl full of sterilised hooks, two bottles of 
rubbing alcohol, cotton swabs and gauze which stood on the table. Stelarc 
had made a drawing “like an acupuncture diagram with hooks instead of 
needle points” for the two assistants helping him. He’d apparently had 
trouble finding assistants, but finally recruited two sympathetic 
performance artists. Stelarc showed the two men what to do with the 
hooks, one would pinch the skin up, and the other would insert the hooks. 
By inserting into skin instead of muscle they would avoid any blood 
vessels or nerve endings and therefore minimise bleeding. “Start with the 
elbows”, he told them. “Go through quickly … pinch the skin more tightly 
… faster … get it symmetrical … grab more flesh …” (1993a:13). 
 
Stelarc then mounted a platform, 18 fishhooks piercing the back of 
his naked frame. Positioning himself face down below a pulley with 18 
rings, Stelarc calmly instructed the two assistants to connect the hooks 
and pulley with the cord. Carr describes the thirty or so spectators around 
the platform as “tiptoe silent”. Suddenly “the body” gasped with pain. “No 
worse than usual”, winced Stelarc, “… just keep forgetting how bad it is”. 
He then instructed his assistants to remove the platform below him, so 
that he’d be left hanging by the hooks, his skin stretching, causing him 
excruciating pain (Carr 1993a:13).  
 
                                            
25 Refer to the chapter entitled “Before and after science”.   
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2.5 Transcended “suspended” body 
“Every subject plays his part … through exploits … that serve as a mode of 
transcendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward 
other liberties” (De Beauvoir 1953:liv). 
 
 In an evolutionary process, technological developments have 
contributed to the human experience of expanding the boundaries of its 
world. As suggested by Simmel, there tends to be a certain relation 
between human bodily capacities, technology and the projects and types 
of physical developments planned and achieved by humans (Shilling 
2005:176-177). Simmel demonstrates this by showing how our world has 
been expanded through the development of the telescope and the 
microscope. Whereas we previously made use only of the natural sense 
of sight to perceive the world, now we have constructed inorganic eyes 
that allow us to disclose and enlarge objects outside our “natural” 
perception of space (Simmel 1971:356).  
 
Marshall McLuhan whose interest in technology focuses on 
technologies as media, reiterates Simmel’s assertion in his book 
Understanding media: the extensions of man (1964) by explaining that the 
personal and social consequences of any medium that challenges the 
boundaries of ourselves, results from new perceptions created by this 
extension of ourselves and by new technology (1964:7). A relational-loop 
is put in place; new technologies generate new perceptions, and these 
generate further boundaries. McLuhan concludes that “[t]hese media, 
being extensions of ourselves, also depend upon us for their interplay and 
their evolution. The fact that they do interact and spawn new progeny has 
been a source of wonderment over the ages” (1964:54). This shows that 
the body-technological interrelationship is one of dynamic symbiosis, the 
human acted upon by technology, and technology acted on by the human. 
 
Stelarc has, throughout his career, reacted to developments in 
technology especially those which relate to the expansion of bodily 
capacities. He has planned and executed projects which challenge the 
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boundaries between the physical and the technological. As mentioned 
earlier, he started his career with a project which consisted of donning a 
helmet and goggles that were designed to “scramble binocular vision by 
superimposing fragmented rear and side views onto the normal frontal 
view” (Massumi 2005:126). His performances have gradually taken 
advantage of technologically altered human perception within the body-
technology interrelationship as the performances described in this thesis 
show.  
 
Considering the relational-loop that exists between the body and 
technology, Stelarc’s performances acknowledge the vulnerability and 
mortality of the body. In addition, the boundaries created by the skin are 
challenged by being pierced and stretched and an impelling 
metamorphosis emerges. By suspending the body, Stelarc expresses the 
relationship forces that emerge between the body and technological 
advancement. These did not only involve the visual but also amplify and 
externalise the internal sounds of the body. Visually and sonically the 
body expresses its metamorphosis.  
 
Although Stelarc expresses the stretched skin as the “gravitational 
landscape” (Atzori & Woolford 1995), he makes it clear during his 
interview with Rainier Linz that by amplifying body sounds, it is possible to 
articulate what is happening inside the body. Describing the heartbeat and 
brainwaves as rhythmic, the stomach sounds as random, and the muscle 
signals as triggered, Stelarc describes the sounds made by the body as 
“buzzing”, “beeping”, “clicking”, “thumping” and “whooshing”. The 
bloodflow, described as a type of “whooshing” wind sound, is captured by 
Doppler ultrasonic sound transducers; the muscles, heartbeat, and 
brainwaves are translated into EMG, plethysmogram, and EEG readouts. 
Stelarc describes how the body, as medium of expression, makes sounds 
that are intrinsic to the performance (Linz 2001). He explains how he uses 
his body as a gravitational landscape by piercing the skin and expresses 
what lies beneath the surface of the pierced skin by presenting the 
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internal organs as amplified sounds. These sounds once again challenge 
the boundaries of the body by emerging into the surrounding space of the 
suspension performance. 
  
The bodily organic expressions of sounds and landscapes as 
created by Stelarc in his performances are described by Massumi as “a 
visibility of gravity and a sonic architecturality” (Massumi 2005:147). 
Claiming suspension as “embodied human possibility”, Massumi explains 
that through it, the body becomes “a transducer, a local organization of 
forces (epidermal elasticity and strength) that responds to, and 
transformatively prolongs, another force (gravity)”. The transducer in this 
case “transforms gravity from an invisible condition of station, locomotion, 
and action into a visibility” (2005:147). This means that the body which is 
suspended visibly expresses the force of gravity on itself as a gravitational 
landscape. As a sonic architecturality, Massumi describes how the “rush 
of blood through the artist’s veins rises in a state of heightened receptivity 
to the effects of gravity” and is therefore transformed into “amplified sound 
waves” that spread to fill the surrounding space (2005:147). 
 
The “compulsive force of unfolding” (Massumi 2005:141) that 
continues throughout Stelarc’s career, are dependent on the body as 
medium of expression. These “extendabilities” (Massumi 2005:148) are 
the beginning of a series of continual adaptations that Stelarc’s “obsolete 
body” creates in response to technological advances. 
 
2.6 Prostheses 
“The body’s obsolescence is the condition of change. Its vitality  
is in obsolescence” (Massumi 2005:152). 
 
On 29 May 1988, Stelarc performed his last suspension in a 
performance called Event for Stretched Skin / Third Hand (The Last 
Suspension), (1988) (fig 6). The dualistic nature of the body had been 
established in its expressive visual and sonic extendabilities but even 
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though transcendence was reached, the body nonetheless remained 
suspended, dysfunctional, and limited. This unfolding of events brought 
Stelarc to a new boundary, that of an evolutionary limitation that suggests 
that we have arrived at a point where we cannot effectively adapt 
ourselves as a purely biological species in the technological environment 
we have created. His response to this was to unfold in a radically new 
evolutionary direction, embracing evolving technology. Stelarc attached a 
robotic Third Hand to the suspended body in order to extend his body 
beyond its own capability. 
 
The Third Hand, a human-like robotic manipulator, was made to 
the dimensions of the real right hand. As prosthesis, the Third Hand was 
attached to the right arm as an extra hand, as an addition rather than a 
substitution. Capable of independent motion, the hand could pinch, grasp, 
release and rotate its wrist 290-degrees in either direction. Capable of 
independent motion, this dexterous robotic manipulator was activated by 
the EMG (electromyogram) signals from the muscles in Stelarc’s 
abdomen and thigh muscles. Electrodes positioned on the four muscle 
sites provided the control signals (Stelarc 1994) even though Stelarc 
stated that he would prefer to have the electrodes surgically implanted 
(Carr 1993a:11). 
 
With the addition of the prosthesis, Stelarc changed the body-
technology relationship by transforming the suspended body into a 
manipulator of technology. But the body is still suspended and the body-
technology symbiosis remains unable to function in any way as a normal 
bipedal human. When the body and the prosthesis are unhooked and 
positioned upright, they become the antithesis of the vulnerable 
suspended body having the appearance of an extended technologised 
cyborg. 
  
Historically, prostheses have been regarded as artificial body parts 
intended to restore the functions of a missing body part and have been 
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the source of many technological innovations, from wooden peg legs to 
legs for athletics modelled on the biomechanics of animals (Shilling 
2005:175). The primary aim of the prosthetist was to make a worker as 
economically productive and as efficient as possible by creating an 
artificial limb which could restore the worker’s productivity. Although 
artificial limbs primarily reflected the anxieties associated with the 
damaged male body, subsequent developments in prostheses made it 
possible for women who had undergone a mastectomy to appear normal 
with the use of silicone gel implants (Shilling 2005:181-183).  
 
But the addition of a prosthesis as used in the Third Hand is not 
meant to replace a missing body part, it is meant to transcend the limits 
imposed by a body that has only two arms. The boundaries of the organic 
mortal body are now extended with this prosthesis, into technology. This 
cyborg, a combination of machine and organism, body and technology, 
regards the prosthesis not as a substitution for a missing limb, but as an 
addition to its functioning ability.  
 
2.7 Initiated cyborg: evolving the posthuman 
 “Altering the architecture of the body results in adjusting and extending  
its awareness of the world” (Stelarc 2000:562). 
 
In the performance by Stelarc called Split Body: Voltage In / 
Voltage Out, (1995) (fig 7) the body/technology interrelationship is 
presented as one of dynamic flux as technology becomes an extension to 
the body, and the body becomes the source of technology. In this event, 
Stelarc walked onto the stage and was helped into a series of electrodes 
that connected him by means of wires to the computer. On his right arm 
was attached the Third Hand as described in the previous performance. 
An assistant started the computer program which caused the left side of 
the body to move. The robotic arm closely followed this movement. The 
computer operator, by pressing icons on a touch-screen which was 
connected to a muscle stimulation system, produced a random set of left-
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side movements (Massumi 2005:165). The robotic Third Hand, however, 
was wired to the right side leg and stomach muscles and was controlled 
by Stelarc who made it move with these muscles in symphony with the 
electronically controlled left side. The body was split into two: voltage in, 
and voltage out. Electricity was transduced by the body into organic 
movement, and organic movement was transduced back into the 
mechanical Third Hand. The performance was accompanied by sound 
effects relayed from electrical impulses picked up from the brain, the 
movement of the muscles and the flow of blood through the body 
(Massumi 2005:166). This performance was described by Massumi as the 
body being “made into a literal transducer – relaying between artificial and 
natural intelligence, human will and programmed motion, organic and 
mechanical movement, electrical magnetic force and organomechanical 
force” (Massumi 2005:166).  
 
This development in Stelarc’s performance art was evidence of a 
shift from the purely organic suspensions through the attachment of the 
prosthetic Third Hand to the creation of a true cyborg which fused man 
and technology. The cyborg was no longer an autonomous bionic 
construction consisting of a prosthesis with biological body fusion, but had 
shifted into incorporating digital information as an integral component of 
its construction. Confirming this, Hayles says that “central to the 
construction of the cyborg are informational pathways connecting the 
organic body to its prosthetic extensions” (1999a:2). 
 
Effectively, Stelarc enabled the human body to embrace 
technology thereby altering its physicality. This has involved physical 
substitution of extensions and enhancements to increase the capacities 
and possibilities of our bodies. Living in an environment in which 
technology and electronics have become an integral part of our existence 
has also brought with it shifts in the way we do things, the way we 
perceive things and the way that we experience our world.  
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Experiments in the combination of electronics and the human brain 
are underway in various institutions around the world. Devices have been 
developed that give humans the ability to communicate by moving a 
cursor on a screen using sheer brainpower and scientists are developing 
neurological tools that may eventually enable paralysed patients to flex 
mechanical limbs, steer a motorised wheelchair and operate robots that 
respond to their needs. There are even experiments to create machines 
that are able to act out the intentions of patients who are unable to move, 
allowing them to communicate their feelings, such as their pleasure at 
seeing a visitor. These preliminary brain-computer interfaces or BCIs 
could link patients’ fully functional brains to the outside world (Brownlee 
2005). 
 
These experiments show the increasingly sophisticated relationship 
between biological capabilities and technological evolutions. In the same 
way, Stelarc performs using his body as transducer by relaying the force 
of electricity into, through, and outside of his body, challenging its 
boundaries and making the human body a source of technological 
intervention.   
 
As informational pathways become central to the construction of 
the cyborg, they provide it with a source of technology that seeks to 
extend itself beyond the current constraints, beyond the confines of a 
single computer within a local space. In 1995, Stelarc in Fractal Flesh, An 
Internet Body Upload Performance26 (1995) (fig 8) extended his body, via 
the Internet into three remote locations, Paris, Helsinki and Amsterdam. In 
order to do this, Stelarc’s performance required a dedicated network of 
modem-linked computers because the World Wide Web was, at that time, 
regarded as “in practice still too slow” (Massumi 2005:170).  
 
                                            
26 Stelarc, Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance (1995). Telepolis, 
Luxembourg (Stelarc:1994). 
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The body and Third Hand were positioned in Luxembourg and 
were wired up to a six-channel muscle-stimulator that controlled the left 
side of the body, the deltoids, biceps, flexors, thigh and calf muscles. In 
Paris, Helsinki and Amsterdam “other bodies” gathered at the specially 
networked terminals to remotely control the body’s movements. Each 
remote computer screen illustrated the places where the electrodes were 
connected to Stelarc’s body. As the left side of the body was moved by 
these “other bodies” touching the remote computer screens at the remote 
locations, 0-60 volts of electricity activated tilt sensors on the head, arms 
and legs which triggered signals and sounds that converted the body into 
a video switcher. The remote “other bodies” not only moved the body but 
also inadvertently composed the sound sequences and the video mixing 
of images that were transmitted back to them (Stelarc 1994).  
 
 Effectively, what was presented was an intimacy without proximity. 
Removed from the close confines of a single space, the “other bodies” 
performed within a relational feedback loop with the artist. As they were 
visible to the artist on video screens, the “other bodies” became an 
integral component of the performance, making them both remote and 
intimate at the same time. The collective audience touched Stelarc’s body 
as presented on the computer screen and this reflects Marshall 
McLuhan’s observation of his time which states: “Today after more than a 
century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous 
system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far 
as our planet is concerned” (1964:3).  
 
In 1995, some 30 years later, Stelarc metaphorically enacted 
McLuhan’s claim by connecting himself via electrodes into the dedicated 
World Wide Web performance. Stelarc’s performance is made up of the 
extension and projection of his inner nervous system outwards via 
informational pathways, beyond the limitations of the body into a reactive 
loop with other bodies. Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload 
Performance (1995) (fig 8) confirms McLuhan’s belief that “[i]n the electric 
40 
 
age, when our central nervous system is technologically extended to 
involve us in the whole of mankind and to incorporate the whole of 
mankind in us, we necessarily participate, in depth, in the consequences 
of our every action” (McLuhan 1964:4-5). McLuhan writes that it is the 
principal aspect of the electric age that establishes a global network that 
has much of the character of our central nervous system. But our central 
nervous system is not merely an electric network, the brain is the 
interactive place where all kinds of impressions and experiences can be 
exchanged and translated, enabling us to react to the world in our own 
individual ways (1964:380).   
 
In the performance of Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload 
Performance (1995) (fig 8), Stelarc’s internal nervous system comes 
together with the global external nervous system forming a single system 
containing many parts. This fusion of organism and technology 
demonstrates the developing cyborg that extends beyond its own 
constraints and transcends itself as hybrid across space and time. Stelarc, 
as an evolutionary guide to the future, describes what he imagines a 
cyborg to be: a multiplicity of bodies spatially separated but electronically 
connected to other bodies in other places with the Internet as a crude 
external nervous system. Constructed in this way, a cyborg becomes an 
extended operational system of collaborating parts (Melanitis 1999). This 
space of intense interaction and feedback which emerges between 
biological organisms and intelligent machines is experienced daily in the 
more prosaic electronically mediated mergings that we perform when we 
answer our cellphones, use our credit cards and log on to the Internet to 
exchange e-mails, speak in chat rooms and gaming rooms and play in 
multi-user dungeons (MUDS). Space and time have been bridged by the 
mere click of a mouse, and have become webs of personal interactions 
pulsating through cyberspace. The organically constructed nervous 
system has extended itself beyond the confines of the biological body and 
has experienced communal and communicational possibilities previously 
unknown.  
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2.8 Virtuality: projected “extended” body 
“Virtual transmission” (Massumi 2005:168). 
 
Whereas Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance  
(1995) (fig 8) needed a dedicated network of modem-linked computers, 
touch screens and the intervention of “other bodies” to complete the 
performance, Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 9) 
demonstrated the effects of electronic technology on the organic body 
with no human intervention. As the Internet infrastructure rapidly extended 
globally, Stelarc in his performance of Ping Body an Internet Actuated 
Performance (1996) (fig 10) uses the force of Internet activity, the external 
ebb and flow of data to stimulate the body’s proprioception and 
musculature. In this case, the body was not moved by its internal nervous 
system but by the intervention of “ping” which is a program that allows 
users to determine how fast networks are handling information. The name 
originates from the Unix “ping” command which measures the echo time 
for a signal to return from a remote computer to a local computer.  
 
With the machine connected to the body randomly “pinging” to over 
40 Internet domains during the performance and measuring the 
reverberating signals, it was possible to map these signals to the body’s 
muscles with the Muscle-Stimulation System, directing the returning 0-60 
volts to the body. This caused the muscles to move in an involuntary “data 
dance” which became a barometer of Internet activity as the ping data 
was transduced as electrical shocks. The larger the ping value, indicating 
a greater Net activity, the more the limbs were activated. The arms and 
legs also had sensors attached that produced sounds reflecting the 
position of the arms and legs by using their bending and velocity. The 
performance was based on activity produced by the Internet which was 
used to compose and choreograph the performance. The Internet became 
not merely a mode of information transmission, but also a transducer of 
physical action (Stelarc 1994).  
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Stelarc described his performance as “a kind of synergistic 
symbiosis” which caused him to lose a sense of self and become just a 
body which was part of the operating system (Melanitis 1999). Confirming 
Stelarc’s claims that “information is the prosthesis that props up the 
obsolete body” (Stelarc 2000:561) (italics mine), Ping Body an Internet 
Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 10) finds the body “profoundly obsolete 
in the intense information environment it has created” (Stelarc 1994). This 
performance has shown that the body can become a vessel which can 
take in external information and react to it. The body “obsolete” can be 
literally plugged into the Internet and with the Third Hand attached, 
emerges as cyborg amalgamated into cyberspace27 and consequently it 
emerges as posthuman. 
 
N Katherine Hayles in “The condition of virtuality” (1999b) defines 
“virtuality” as “material objects [that] are interpenetrated by informational 
patterns” (1999b:69). This definition expresses a Cartesian duality which 
consists, not of mind and body, but of matter on one side and information 
on the other. Hayles explains the difference between matter and 
information as a historical construction that emerged in the wake of World 
War II when the theorist Claude Shannon defined a mathematical quantity 
he called information. Shannon’s definition of information as a pattern 
rather than a presence supported the distinction between matter and 
information that was becoming central in molecular biology during this 
same period. Richard Doyle in his analysis of the discourse of molecular 
biology shows that the gene contains the original informational pattern 
that produces the body, even though the gene is contained within the 
body and not outside of it. This “impossible inversion” as Doyle calls it, 
was used by Richard Dawkins in his famous book The Selfish Gene 
                                            
27 Shilling (2005:174) refers to William Gibson’s book Neuromancer (1984) (New York: 
Ace) in which Cyberspace has been described as a ‘consensual hallucination’, which is 
the broad term that refers to computer or electronically mediated communications which 
generate virtual places in which information is accessed and people can interact without 
having to be physically co-present with others.  
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(1976). Dawkins said that the genes are “informational agents that control 
the ‘lumbering robots’ called human beings” and that “informational 
pattern triumphs over the body’s materiality – a pattern achieved first by 
distinguishing between pattern and materiality and then by privileging 
pattern over materiality”. This privileging of pattern or information over 
materiality meant that information was free-floating, unaffected by 
changes in context. This emerged as constructed informational virtuality 
(Hayles 1999b:69-74). 
 
Weiner in The human use of human beings: cybernetics and 
society (1954) explains that a pattern is a message, and therefore it may 
be transmitted as sound or light in a radio or television, for instance. 
Weiner then considers what would happen if “we were to transmit the 
whole pattern of the human body, of the human brain with its memories 
and cross connections, so that a hypothetical receiving instrument could 
re-embody these messages in appropriate matter, capable of continuing 
the processes already in the body and the mind” (1954:95-96). Hayles 
describes how Moravec argues that human beings are essentially 
informational patterns rather than bodily presences. The proposal implies 
that a human being is a message instantiated within a biological substrate 
but not intrinsic to it. Extract the information from the medium, and there is 
a pattern that can be encoded and reconstituted in another medium. 
Information, therefore, is conceived as pattern divorced from a material 
medium and which is therefore free to travel across time and space. The 
idea of telegraphing a person in the 1950s as envisaged by Weiner had, 
by the 1990s, achieved the status of a cultural icon. “Beam me up Scotty” 
as quoted by Hayles, reflects the same operation but with different 
“imaginary” technology (1999b:75). 
  
Separating information from material is an alignment with the 
Cartesian body-mind dualism. The belief that an immaterial essence, 
which is the individual’s true nature, can be extracted from its material 
instantiation and can live free from that body, reflects a much older and 
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more traditional duality, that of spirit and matter which assigns a soul to 
the human being. The matter/information duality as outlined creates the 
human being from patterns of information (Hayles 1999b:73).  
 
The Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 9) 
allows for the transcendence of the material body; not by traditional 
religious beliefs but by technology. Technology has made it possible to 
leave the body behind and transcend beyond its corporeal limitations. 
Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 10) has shown 
that technology has enabled a qualitative leap in the evolutionary process 
of the human being by incorporating the biological body with disembodied 
intelligence found in the space of virtual reality, and extending it as the 
posthuman. Virtual reality makes it possible for the “self” through technical 
interventions to enter and leave the world of cyberspace as a 
disembodied prosthesis, as an “extended” body. In Ping Body an Internet 
Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 10), the body is once more suspended, 
but now through the external electronic nervous system of the Internet. It 
defies once more the force of gravity and extends itself beyond the 
“obsolete” body into a realm that seeks to overcome death and mortality, 
into the realm of virtuality.  
 
The word “virtual” means: almost, but not the actual thing28. 
Historically, the notion of the virtual has long been culturally significant, 
existing in the form of rituals and in the built form of architectural 
fantasies, simulations and environments. Rob Shields outlines in The 
                                            
28 The ‘virtual’ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as: “Anything that is so in 
essence or effect, although not formally or actually; admitting of being called by the name 
so far as the effect or result is concerned” (Shields 2003:2). Rob Shields explains how 
debates arose during the Reformation concerning the mystical transubstantiation of the 
Christian Eucharist – the conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. 
The Church insisted on the “actually real, material body and blood”, whereas the 
Reformation theologians argued for “virtually real”. As religious debates continued, the 
doctrine of ‘Virtualism’ raised questions concerning the way presence was understood – 
must it be concrete and embodied or was “essentially present” good enough? Was there 
anything there if it was virtual? (Shields 2003:5-6). 
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virtual (2003) that the elaborate virtual environments found in the interior 
decoration of churches, would be another historical era celebrating the 
virtual. Baroque architecture and decoration created dramatic spaces of 
swirling movements in paint, plaster, and marble. Religious Baroque 
church ceilings with their scenes of heavenly delights were designed to 
draw the viewer into a space which allowed them to transcend the 
temporal world but at the same time reminded him/her that he/she was a 
“fallen mortal”. In Cartesian terms, the mind and the soul could escape the 
daily grind but the body was the dead weight which pulled the mortal back 
to earth (Shields 2003:7-8).  
 
These religious virtual environments separated the mind and the 
body into the virtual and the material which in religious terms denotes the 
soul and the flesh. There is a difference between the religious philosophy 
that assigns a soul which transcends the human body and the technology 
that merely requires a computer interface to transcend the boundaries of 
the body. In the religious context of the virtual, the soul reaches out to 
communicate with a higher spiritual being, whereas in the technologically 
enhanced space of virtual reality, the body aspires to communicate with 
cyberspace. Whereas the traditional religious beliefs have spiritual 
meaning for many people, the virtual spaces of technology make it 
possible to leave the corporeal behind and enter a new kind of space 
where transcendence means, not God, but the electronic space of virtual 
reality. 
  
Technology has provided prostheses as substitutes for the real. 
Virtual reality is the promise of an ideal world not unlike “heaven” where 
we can enter and leave at will, where we become our own creators and 
can control our own existence. Technological virtual reality seems to 
make possible a world that bypasses the mortality of the body.  
 
In Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 9), 
Stelarc presents computer interfaces and informational technologies as 
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the means to leave the body behind and emphasise the virtual human-as-
information which can occupy a disembodied space. Technology 
becomes the force that makes it possible to project the “inner space” of 
the body into an “outer space” thereby becoming a prosthesis. In Ping 
Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 10) the visible 
boundary of the flesh is reconstructed and not pierced as in the 
suspension events, but the embodiment of the subject transcends the 
inner space and is projected into an outer space, detaching itself from the 
mortal body. The body thus transcends itself through the disembodied 
prosthesis.  
 
In this way, the computer user becomes the creator of his/her own 
existence, and can choose to be projected as any gender, class, race or 
age. Social and cultural norms can be changed and rechanged at will. In 
the context of the virtual environment, the projected prosthesis questions 
the relationship between the human body and the chosen “virtual” identity 
and it becomes clear that this relationship can no longer be taken for 
granted. A new type of relationship is constructed between the traditional 
body/self and the new disembodied transformed self of virtual reality.  
 
This new relationship between the body and virtual reality is 
illustrated by the creation of “Julie”. Allucquere Rosanne Stone, cultural 
theorist, emblematic transsexual and cyber theorist/performer wrote “Will 
the real body please stand up? Boundary stories about virtual cultures”, 
where he/she described Julie, a totally disabled woman who could only 
communicate by pushing the keys of a computer with her headstick. In 
1985 Julie, on a computer conference in New York, projected her 
personality onto the Internet as extroverted and her warm greeting of “Hi!” 
gave the impression of a person who had a natural affinity with other 
women. Her disability became invisible and irrelevant. In her intimate 
electronic relationships with women whom she had never met, they 
shared their deepest thoughts. Julie, trapped inside her ruined body, 
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sharp and perceptive, thoughtful and caring, offered them advice that 
changed their lives. 
  
After several years, Stone describes how something happened that 
shocked the conference to the core. It was revealed that “Julie” did not 
exist. “She” was a middle aged male psychiatrist who, whilst logging on 
for the first time, had accidentally begun a discussion with a woman who 
mistook him for a woman. “I was stunned” he had later said. He had 
explained that he “hadn’t known that women talked amongst themselves 
that way. There was so much vulnerability, so much depth and 
complexity. Men’s conversations on the Nets were much more guarded 
and superficial, even among intimates. It was fascinating, and I wanted 
more.” Spending weeks he developed the “right persona” which was that 
of a totally disabled single older woman who would not be expected to 
have a social life. Her existence only as a Net persona would therefore 
seem natural. “Julie” worked this way for several years until one of her 
admirers tracked her down in the hope of meeting her in person. As the 
news of “Julie’s” unmasking was uncovered, the news spread through the 
Net. Reactions, as Stone records, ranged from humorous resignation to 
blind rage. Most deeply affected were those women who had shared their 
innermost feelings with Julie. It is reported that one said, “I felt raped. I felt 
that my deepest feelings had been violated”. Several felt that the progress 
they had made in their personal and emotional lives had been predicated 
on deceit and trickery (2000:505).  
 
“Julie” is an example of a relationship between a personality 
created by the Internet, a “virtual persona” and actual human beings. 
Race, gender, and social standing are no longer confined to an actual 
person but can be virtually created to occupy a space which transcends 
beyond the boundary of the corporeal body by computer technology.  
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2.9 Biotechnology: “living” prosthesis 
Early in his career Stelarc said that “[t]he artist can become an 
evolutionary guide, extrapolating new trajectories; a genetic sculptor, 
restructuring and hypersensitizing the human body; an architect of internal 
body spaces; a primal surgeon” (Clarke 2005:210). For almost six years 
after Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 10), Stelarc 
pursued his next evolutionary step. Not merely a cosmetic modification or 
anatomical adjustment to the existing body structure (Stelarc 1994), 
Stelarc pursued a “living” prosthesis to the body. The development of 
Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) using tissue engineering techniques was 
the result.  
 
Stelarc, together with the Tissue Culture and Art (TCA) project 
hosted by SymbioticA, in collaboration with a German laboratory, grew a 
tissue-engineered ear, a semi-live entity which he hoped would one day 
be attached to his arm as an example of a new kind of attachment or 
extension to the body, a partial life form, partly constructed and partly 
grown, a soft prosthesis. The ear was cultured using Stelarc’s cells 
combined with a donor’s human cells in a rotating microgravity bioreactor 
that kept the nutrients washing over the ear and allowed the cells to grow 
(Smith 2005b:240). This prosthesis could be regarded as “flesh of my 
flesh” and is projected as a possibility by Stelarc in Ear on an Arm 
Visualization (2003) (fig 12). 
 
Stelarc chose an ear because he believes that an ear is a “beautiful 
and complex structure”, and that an ear “not only hears but is also the 
organ of balance (Stelarc 2000:563). The ear hears by collecting 
soundwaves from the external environment around the body and then 
transmits these soundwaves to the eardrum to be transferred into nerve 
impulses to the brain.  
 
In Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 9), 
information technology extended the nervous system into a virtual 
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prosthesis. In this performance, in contrast, Stelarc does not project his 
nervous system and internal organs outwards into the virtual nervous 
system of the Internet and cyberspace but Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 
11 and 12) challenges the balance between the organic and technology. 
This performance shows that living tissue can be sustained, grown and is 
able to function outside the body, as life would be created outside the 
uterus. Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) shows the increasing ability to 
manipulate living systems that have been enabled by advances in 
biotechnology, genetic engineering, in vitro fertilisation and transplant 
surgery. These developments have all made possible the reconstruction, 
replacement or formation of living organisms. Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) 
(fig 11 and 12), rather than the replacing of a missing limb or organ, acts 
as an addition to the body by altering its organic structure. Extra Ear ¼ 
Scale (2003) (fig 11 and 12) can never be able to replicate the original 
function of an ear but Stelarc, in a new development, has spoken of 
inserting a chip into the ear that would create an additional bodily function. 
 
Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) focuses attention on the notion of 
creating life. Orlan Catts, who leads the TCA team, makes reference to 
the “most striking images of the late 20th Century – that of the ear on the 
back of a mouse” (Sandhana [S.a.]). The ear on a mouse is grown as 
replacement parts to treat victims of disease or accident, whereas 
Stelarc’s Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) is grown from the desire to 
transcend the corporeal body. But the prosthesis as partial life form points 
back to the importance of the body. Virtual reality presents the hope of 
existing beyond the mortal body, whereas Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 
11 and 12) presents the reality of the flesh but offers us the possibility to 
become our own creators and extend our mortal life. 
 
 The body, no matter how transformed through prosthesis, virtual 
reality or biotechnology, never seems to escape the state of 
“obsolescence“, according to Stelarc. This state of obsolescence is the 
motivating factor that makes Stelarc seek the technologised body as the 
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source of its own transcendence. Evidence of this is seen as the selected 
artworks of Stelarc are seen in chronological order. These artworks have 
positioned the body both as “obsolete” in the technological environment it 
has created and also as the source of its own transcendence. As 
technology has advanced, so Stelarc has used it to further prove his point 
that boundaries can be challenged and broken through. 
  
Throughout this chapter there has been the developing emergence 
of the mechanical prosthesis as an addition to the body, making the body 
closer to what is classified as a cyborg. Reacting to electrodes and the 
Internet, the body emerged as the cybernetic hybrid which was able to 
embrace electronic communication structures that bridged space and 
time. As information technology developed, the body was able to extend 
itself as a virtual prosthesis, as posthuman, into cyberspace, just as the 
spirit desired in Western religion to transcend itself into an afterlife in 
“heaven”. Virtuality has enabled the body to be left behind in a space 
where the material body is not needed but it becomes obvious that it is 
impossible to leave the body behind totally. The self always has to return 
back to itself, the body returns to its own “flesh” and Stelarc becomes 
Stelarc once more. 
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Chapter Three: Reclaiming the body 
 
 
Chapter Two positioned the body as a bounded “obsolete” “object” 
whose boundaries were altered, extended, redesigned and transcended 
by technological advancements. Living in an environment in which 
technology and electronics have become an integral part of our existence 
has brought about changes in embodied and disembodied experiences. 
The Cartesian notion29 of separating the mind from the body and placing 
the mind in a superior position above the body has influenced the concept 
of virtuality. Virtuality, as the construct which privileges pattern or 
information over materiality, has emerged as the belief or digital fantasy 
that an immaterial essence, the individual’s true nature, can live free from 
the material body. Technical intervention has made it possible for the 
immaterial “self” to transcend the boundaries of the material body into 
cyberspace. 
 
Acknowledging that evolving technology has moved the body to 
incorporate the cyborg and/or the posthuman, I will in this chapter reclaim 
the “obsolete” body as the lived, experiential body by exploring the 
importance of the body’s corporeality and embodiment as necessary to 
exist within and make sense of our surrounding world. I will position 
Stelarc against himself by exploring the contradiction that exists between 
Stelarc’s performances and his rhetoric. To verify my argument I will 
substantiate the importance of the body’s corporeality as outlined by 
theorists and researchers within the fields of philosophy, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), and neuroscience. I will use the work of Simon Penny, 
Hubert L Dreyfus, and Antonio Damasio who all reflect Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology that contests the logic of Cartesianism.     
                                            
29 Cottingham references Descartes: “The thinking thing that is ‘me’ is ‘really distinct from 
the body and can exist without it’” (“Cottingham” 1992a:236). 
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3.1 The importance of the body marginalised 
Before reclaiming the obsolete body I need to briefly show why the 
desire to claim the body as obsolete in the hope of transcending this 
obsolete body, is so appealing. This negative view of the physical flesh 
dominant in Western thought can, as Shilling says, be traced as far back 
as ancient Greece. Socrates argued that lasting happiness came not from 
the “perishable” body but through the “immortal soul”. Shilling agrees with 
Socrates by saying that “Greek ethics held that the soul’s aspirations 
should be guided by a self-control termed ‘healthy thinking’ which 
opposed itself to the inevitable ‘sufferings’ of the bodily instincts and 
emotions” (2005:7-8). Christianity, moving on from Greek ethics, has 
given meaning to the striving for transcendence by raising the spiritual 
above the corporeal. Christians live by the belief in the abstract concept of 
the life everlasting in the world to come. Thus the importance of the body 
was marginalised by the suggestion that it was the mind that made us 
truly human. 
 
 Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile bodies: toward a corporeal feminism 
(1994) also notes that some of the key features we have inherited in our 
current conception of the body can be traced to the fact that the body has 
been regarded as a source of interference in, and a danger to, the 
operation of reason. Grosz relates how Plato sees the body as a prison 
for the soul, reason, or mind. For Plato, it was evident that reason should 
rule over the body and over the irrational functions of the soul. Grosz 
outlines how Descartes, by extending Greek philosophy, not only enforced 
the idea of the separation of the mind from the body, but also the 
separation of soul from nature. Descartes distinguished two kinds of 
substances: mind (res cogitans) from an extended substance body (res 
extensa). Only the latter, he believed, could be considered part of nature, 
governed by its physical laws and ontological exigencies. The body as a 
self-moving machine, a mechanical device, in his view, functions 
according to causal laws and the laws of nature. The mind, the thinking 
substance, the soul or consciousness, has no place in the natural world. 
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Grosz concludes that this exclusion of the soul from nature, this 
evacuation of consciousness from the world, is the prerequisite for the 
founding of a science of the governing principles of nature, a science 
which excludes and is indifferent to, considerations of the subject. 
Descartes succeeded in placing the mind in a position of hierarchical 
superiority over and above nature, including the nature of the body. The 
subject or consciousness is separated from and can therefore reflect on 
the world of the body, objects, and material qualities (Grosz 1994:5-6). 
Descartes instituted a dualism which, up to the present time, still exerts 
intellectual influences. 
   
Antonio R. Damasio, a professor of neurology at the University of 
Iowa College of Medicine, points out that, by the middle of the twentieth 
century, the Cartesian idea of a disembodied mind seems to have been 
the source for the metaphor of mind as a software program which is run in 
a piece of computer hardware called “the brain”. The same Cartesian 
disembodiment may also be behind the thinking of neuroscientists who 
insist that the mind can be fully explained solely in terms of brain events, 
leaving by the wayside the rest of the organism and the surrounding 
physical and social environment. 
  
Damasio points out that the disembodied mind seems to have 
shaped the way Western medicine approaches the study and treatment of 
diseases. The Cartesian split pervades both research and practice, 
resulting in the fact that the psychological consequences of diseases are 
usually ignored in favour of the so-called real diseases of the body. Also 
neglected, says Damasio, is the reverse, the body-proper effects of 
psychological illnesses (1994:250-251). For the past three centuries, the 
aim of biological studies and of medicine has been the understanding of 
the physiology and pathology of the body proper. The mind, according to 
Damasio, was largely left as a concern for religion and philosophy, and 
even when it later became the focus of the discipline of psychology, it still 
did not gain entry into the fields of biology and medicine (1994:255). 
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3.2 Stelarc’s contradiction: the body’s affective materiality 
 
Stelarc, in unyielding Cartesian rhetoric, claims “the body is 
obsolete” (italics mine). In this chapter, I want to call attention to the 
body’s affective materiality and in doing so, demonstrate that his claims 
are often contradictory to his performances.  Stelarc, in no uncertain 
terms, performs with the “body”. It is the body that is suspended, 
extended, penetrated, shocked, in pain and bleeding and it remains the 
focal point of his performances. Stelarc’s utopian desire for bodily 
transcendence is belied by the evidence of his work. His explicit statement 
that calls directly for the transcendence of the human body: “My events 
are involved with transcending normal human parameters, including pain” 
(quote in Jones 2005:89), contradicts his bodily experiences of pain. 
Comparing his pain to that of a woman in childbirth, Stelarc says: “A 
woman goes through tremendous pain to give birth and it’s worth it. I 
identify with that. The pain is inevitable” (quote in Jones 2005:97). This 
points to Stelarc’s acknowledgement of physical pain. Likewise, it is this 
pain, this sensation of self-inflicted pain and the automatic response to 
this perception of pain that provokes a response from the spectator, even 
if it is an empathetic identification. It is in anticipation of this pain, that a 
personal, visceral and affective response is generated from the act of 
Stelarc’s performance. It is this response that provides the performance 
with the power to provoke new ways of thinking about the body and 
embodiment. If there were no sensation of pain in Stelarc’s performances, 
they would not provoke the same response from an audience. This is a 
direct contradiction with Stelarc’s theory of obsolescence. By reconciling 
and comparing his self-inflicted pain in art-making to the natural process 
of a woman giving birth, he clearly emphasises the body as corporeal, 
embodied and capable of feelings and suffering.  
 
It is my contention that Stelarc’s visceral performances and the 
obvious materiality of his body, contradict his rhetoric. The body refuses to 
disappear or to become obsolete as Stelarc claims. The body 
performance which leaves it pierced, bleeding, invaded, shocked, feeling 
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and perceiving rather than questioning its obsolescence, I believe, 
questions its anxieties about mortality. 
  
In the performance Hollow Body / Host Space: Stomach Sculpture 
(1993) (fig 13), Stelarc says that “the hollow body becomes a host, not for 
a self or a soul, but simply for a sculpture” (italics mine) (Stelarc 
2000:565). In order to illustrate his theory of the “hollow” body, he 
designed a sculpture which would penetrate the boundaries of the body. 
With the assistance of a jeweller and a microsurgery instrument maker, a 
capsule structure that would transform itself by extending in size once 
inside the stomach, was designed. The closed capsule with a beeping 
sound and flashing light was inserted down the oesophagus and 
approximately 40cm into the stomach by means of a flexidrive cable 
attached to a control box outside the body (Stelarc 1994). Documenting 
the whole performance using video endoscopy equipment, the “hollow” 
body ironically had a problem with excess saliva and the probes had to be 
hastily removed on several occasions (Atzori & Woolford 1995). Viewing 
the gleaming stomach walls and its contents moving about on a video 
screen, this work displays the internal body as vulnerable and wet, porous 
and enmeshed in the flesh of this world rather than a hollow construction. 
This is confirmed by the microfilm image of the inside of the artist’s 
stomach (1973) (fig 14). Once again, Stelarc contradicts his own theory. 
  
In contrast to Stelarc’s statement that he strives “to hollow, harden 
and dehydrate the body to make it more durable and less vulnerable” 
(Stelarc 1994), the British-Palestinian artist Mona Hatoum engages the 
body as corporeal, wet and mortal, by questioning the boundaries 
between interior and exterior within the dualistic logic of the Cartesian 
thought that differentiates the body from the self. In her 1994 project 
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Corps Étranger [Foreign Body and Strange Body] 30 Hatoum makes use of 
arthroscopic photography and ultrasound to make visible the wet, swilling 
folds of the body’s interior, revelling in its viscosity. Amelia Jones 
describes the video footage imagery as “… viscous, tunnelling, wet, 
pulsating …” (2005:108). 
 
In Hatoum’s installation, the viewer enters a small circular white 
booth to loom over a 5 foot circular screen built into the floor. 
Accompanied by the eerie sounds of the body’s internal workings, the 
pulsating rhythms of Hatoum’s breath, heartbeat, and gurgling viscera, the 
video footage of the arthroscopic camera moves across the body’s 
surfaces and penetrates all the orifices and passageways. At one point it 
is oesophageal, at another nasal, at another it shows the smooth surface 
of the stomach. It moves from arm to head to throat, through intestines, 
anus and the vaginal cavity (Jones 2005:108). 
   
Art historian Christine Ross describes the most disturbing images 
of Corps Étranger as those that show the visceral body scanned by the 
endoscope and coloscope. The body’s deep cavities are illuminated and 
examined by the camera in its probing search for orifices, moving deeper 
and deeper, as if compelled to go on blindly without beginning or end, re-
emerging and then seeking elsewhere. Ross describes how viewers feel 
themselves absorbed by what they are so intently looking at, as if they 
themselves were being pulled down into the profound darkness of the 
body’s cavities (Ross 2003:516-517). 
   
Hatoum, by merging interior and exterior, draws us in through an 
identification with the flesh that points to the impossibility of identifying 
with the body as transcendent. The body in her work is seen as organic 
                                            
30 Mona Hatoum, Corps Étranger [Foreign Body and Strange Body] (1994). Centre 
Georges Pompidou Musée national d’art modern. Corps Étranger was originally 
produced for a 1994 exhibition at the Centre Georges Pompidou’s Musée national d’art 
moderne, and was subsequently shown at the Venice Biennale and at the Tate Gallery in 
an exhibition entitled Rites of Passage (“Ross” 2003:516). 
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and mortal. The flow of bodily fluids exposes the vulnerability of human 
existence.  
    
Another powerful counterexample to Stelarc’s “obsolete” “Hollow 
Body” is Orlan’s suffering body. Orlan, the French body artist, has plastic 
surgeons cut into the flesh of her face, lifting the skin to reconfigure its 
contours while she is completely awake but numbed by local 
anaesthetics. Through these performances, for instance, Omnipresence 
(1993)31, which are carefully staged in operating rooms, Orlan performs 
the “brute, bloody, there-ness” of the body (Jones 1998:227). Orlan does 
not transcend the bloody flesh of her body, she rather points to the fact 
that plastic surgery, the piercing and cutting of the skin, rather than 
allowing us to gain control over our bodies, emphasises our subordination 
to their vulnerabilities and mortality. Jones concurs by saying that “Orlan 
returns us to the inexorable corporeality of the self” (1998:227-228). 
 
Orlan, by having her skin peeled away from her body, “strips away 
the ideological assumptions underpinning the notion of the Cartesian 
subject (that this subject is pure interiority, her body simply a container 
that can be transcended through thought)” (Jones 1998:227). Both Orlan 
and Hatoum’s artworks confuse the boundaries between interior and 
exterior, those boundaries that differentiate the body from the self within, 
the seat of the dualistic logic of Cartesian thought. Hatoum and Orlan 
portray art as a performance that is premised on bodily knowledge which 
implicitly contradicts the mind/body duality and therefore contradicts 
Stelarc’s theory of transcendence.  
 
3.3 Reclaiming the “obsolete” body 
Technotheorist Simon Penny points to recent neurological research 
that places his argument against the mind and body dualism that 
                                            
31 Orlan, Omnipresence (1993). Sandra Gering Gallery, New York. Performed in a 
carefully staged operating room and projected by video around the world through satellite 
relay (Jones 1998:227). 
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privileges the abstract and transcendent over the embodied and concrete. 
Pointing to recent neurological research that has shown that the stomach 
is far more neurally complex than has been supposed32, Penny questions 
why we believe that consciousness is exclusively located in the brain, 
when we place so much faith in our “gut feelings” and other bodily 
responses (1997:34).  
 
Penny describes that early in embryogenesis, a formation called 
the “neural crest” splits. Half forms the brain and the spinal cord, and the 
other half becomes the nervous system of the gut. Under the strong 
influence of the Cartesian thought, it was presumed in medical science 
that the gut, like the rest of the body, was a “kind of meat puppet, a slave 
of the master brain” (Penny 1997:35). The entire intestine is sheathed in 
two concentric sleeves of neural tissue, isolated with an equivalent of the 
blood / brain barrier which has over one hundred million neurons (many 
more than the spinal cord) (Penny 1997:35).33 Penny believes that if the 
gut were wired to a PET scan machine, we would find that it had a form of 
consciousness, or neural activity. He concludes that although the 
revelations of recent neurophysiology leave no doubt that the multiple 
organs of the brain interpret sense data, formulate concepts and leave 
traces from which memories are reconstructed, this does not mean we 
should necessarily subordinate the body’s consciousness to that of the 
brain (Penny 1997:35).  
 
Penny’s position is supported by Hubert L Dreyfus who maintains 
that we have a “human mind by virtue of having a human body” (Dreyfus 
in Penny 1997:34)34. Penny observes that long before the era of 
                                                                                                                       
 
32 Penny refers to research done by Terrence Powley et al, at Purdue University, 
reported in Discover, May 1995. 
33 Penny refers to “Complex and Hidden Brain in the Gut,” New York Times in January 
1996. 
34 Dreyfus, as one of the first researchers to enter into AI discourse, has since 1965, 
claimed the importance of the body within the field of AI and within the field of 
epistemology. 
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European transoceanic exploration, Polynesians in wooden canoes were 
successfully navigating vast distances between the tiny islands that lie in 
the Pacific. It is said that they could, without compass, sextant or 
chronometer, sense the location of islands over the horizon by the effect 
of the ocean swell on their canoes and therefore on their bodies. This kind 
of intelligence is inseparable from the body and supports Dreyfus’ 
argument that we understand the world through our bodies as well as our 
minds (Penny 1997:34). Artificial intelligence, Dreyfus believes, is a 
“machine without a body” and therefore “would never understand the 
world as we do” (Dreyfus in Penny 1997:34). Penny notes that the 
limitations of AI also impair the development of basic common sense and 
motor skills among young children who continuously use computers, video 
games and watch television. Certain German insurance companies now 
sponsor summer schools where  children are taught the basics of bodily 
functions such as the fact that open flames can cause burns and pain, 
and that falling off a bicycle hurts35 (Penny 1997:36). 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology suggests that “our 
bodies provide us with our ‘opening onto’ our ‘vehicle of being in’, and our 
‘means of communication with’ the world” (Shilling 2005:7-8). Merleau-
Ponty rejected the idea that bodies could be seen only as objects and 
consequently he saw bodies as sites of subjectivity and consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty believed that the “structure and meaning of the world and 
the integrity of objects are ‘achieved through the medium of body 
experience’” (Shilling 2005:7-8). Embodied subjects develop purpose and 
direction on the basis of the practical engagements they have with their 
surroundings and “through the intentionality they develop as a result of the 
situatedness of embodied existence”36 (Shilling 2005:55).  
 
                                            
35Helen Michaelson, Media Museum, Zentrum feur Kunst and Mediatechnologie, 
Karlsruhe. Interview, personal notes. 
36 Shilling quotes from Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. The Phenomenology of Perception. 
1962. London: Routledge. 
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Reflecting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, a growing number of 
theorists and researchers within the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, 
and AI have contested the logic of Cartesianism. In contrast, to the 
transcendent body, this chapter indicates that we cannot be disembodied 
beings and choose to leave our bodies behind and live in cyberspace as 
pure minds free of our messy bodies. Reclaiming the “obsolete” body, the 
body presented by Dreyfus and Damasio draws attention to the 
importance of the body as central to our existence. 
   
Emphasising the importance of our bodies in making sense of the 
world, Dreyfus gives examples of how we acquire skills through bodily 
involvement and presence. These examples demonstrate how feelings 
and bodily coping skills are necessary to understand language and to 
locate ourselves in space, and that the body is central to aspects of 
imagination, perception and social interaction (Dreyfus 1992:ix-xxviii). In 
his book What computers still can’t do: a critique of artificial reason 
(1992), Dreyfus explains how it is an everyday commonsense 
understanding of both mind and body which allows us as humans to 
experience what is relevant to us as we deal with life. The Cartesian 
dualism of mind and body makes it difficult to process the feelings, 
interests, motivations and bodily capacities that make up human beings. 
To separate the mind from the body and build a device that could capture 
both our humanity and be able to act and learn in our world, is therefore 
improbable (Dreyfus 1992:ix-xxviii). Contesting the Cartesian mind/body 
duality, Dreyfus presents recent neuroscientific findings that defend 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “our body is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a 
grouping of lived-through meanings that moves towards its equilibrium” 
(Dreyfus 2005:138-142).  
 
Antonio R. Damasio in his book Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, 
and the human brain (1994), presents his research and findings on 
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Descartes’ error37. Damasio contests Descartes38 by relating the error in 
Descartes’ theory of duality. He says that the error is: 
the abysmal separation between body and mind, between the 
sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible 
body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, 
un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the suggestion that 
reasoning, moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from 
physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from 
the body. Specifically: the separation of the most refined 
operations of mind from the structure and operation of a biological 
organism (Damasio 1994:249-250).  
 
 
Clinical and experimental work over two decades with a large 
number of neurological patients (Damasio 1994:xi-xii) has led Damasio to 
suggest that feelings are a powerful influence on reason, and that the 
brain systems required by feelings are enmeshed in those needed by 
reason, and that these systems are interwoven with those that regulate 
the body (Damasio 1994:246).  
 
                                            
37 Damasio describes how one could reproach Descartes for having other errors in his 
theories. Descartes persuaded biologists to adopt clockwork mechanics as a model for 
life processes (1994:248). Other errors that he made confirm that his theories were 
unsound. For instance, Descartes believed that heat made blood circulate, and that tiny 
fine particles of the blood distilled themselves into “animal spirits”, which could then 
move muscles. Damasio states that the mind, brain and body duality notions remain 
influential even though he discredits them (Damasio 1994:250). 
38 For Damasio the statement which first appeared in the fourth section of Descartes’ 
Discourse on Method (1637), in French, and then in the first part of the Principles of 
Philosophy (1644) in Latin (“Cogito ergo sum”), taken literally, illustrates precisely the 
opposite of what Damasio says he believes to be true about the origins of mind and 
about the relationship between mind and body (1994:248).  
Damasio relates how Descartes imagined thinking as an activity quite separate 
from the body, celebrating the separation of the mind, the “thinking Thing” (res cogitans), 
from the nonthinking body, that which has extension and mechanical parts (res extensa) 
(Damasio 1994:248). Damasio cites Descartes who wrote: “ … and remarking that this 
truth ‘I think, therefore I am’  was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant 
suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the 
conclusion that I would receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy 
for which I was seeking”. 
Descartes clarifies this statement as follows: “From that I knew that I was a 
substance, the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence 
there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this ‘me,’ 
that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even 
more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease 
to be what it is.” Damasio cites Descartes from R Descartes (1637) The Philosophical 
Works of Descartes, rendered into English by Elizabeth S Haldane and G R T Ross, vol. 
1, page 101. New York: Cambridge University Press (1970) (Damasio 1994:249). 
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   The facts Damasio presents about feelings and reason, along with 
those he discusses about the interconnection between brain and body 
proper, support his idea that  
the comprehensive understanding of the human mind requires an 
organismic perspective; that not only must the mind move from a 
nonphysical cogitum to the realm of biological tissue, but it must 
also be related to a whole organism possessed of integrated body 
proper and brain and fully interactive with a physical and social 
environment (Damasio 1994:252).  
 
What Damasio means is that when we, as a whole person, see, 
hear, touch, taste or smell, the body and the brain participate in the 
interaction with the environment (1994:224-225). 
 
The whole person which Damasio speaks of is the very “real 
mental construction” which Damasio calls “self”, and this “self” is based on 
activities initiated by both the body and the mind. The “self” to Damasio is 
a continuously reconstructed biological state; it is not “a little person, the 
infamous homunculus, inside your brain contemplating what is going on” 
(1994:227). 
 
Stelarc, as a performance artist, obsessively manipulates the brute 
materiality of the body as artwork. The body performs whilst full of hooks, 
stretched, bleeding, in pain, with prosthetics added, by being shocked, 
controlled and controlling, having mechanisms inserted into it and having 
flesh grown. These manipulations shift our understanding of Stelarc’s 
work because we begin to understand that the obstinate refusal of the 
materiality of the corporeal body to disappear in Stelarc’s performances is 
aligned with the obdurate refusal of the corporeal body to fade into 
“obsolescence” in our daily living. It is our bodies that allow us to engage 
with the world around us.  
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Conclusion 
 
“He thinks of his performances … as a direct ‘physical experience of ideas.’  
In performance, ‘expression and experience join,’ making the body an ‘actual 
manifestation of a concept’” (Massumi 2005:125). 
 
Since the 1960s, Stelarc has consistently aligned his performances 
with evolving technology through the medium of performance art. In these 
performances, his body is yoked with technology and this demonstrates 
and emphasises the influence of technology on the reality of his body. 
Through Stelarc’s rhetoric and performances, the body is positioned as 
both obsolete/limited as well as the source of its own transcendence.  
 
Stelarc places the body into unnatural situations that demonstrate 
the body’s limitations in order to prove his claim that “the body is 
obsolete”. The body as suspended becomes the manifestation of its own 
obsolescence because it has reached its limitations. The technologised 
body is unable to function normally and becomes unable to fulfill its 
purpose as a bipedal human body. This proves Stelarc’s theory that we 
have arrived at a point where we cannot effectively adapt ourselves as a 
purely biological species in the technological environment we have 
created.  
 
But the outcome is ambiguous. Considering the skin as a boundary 
of the body, the deliberate breaking and stretching of that boundary 
becomes the metaphorical act of breaking through boundaries of the body 
through the use of technology. The technologised body performs both the 
state of being bounded and the transcending of that boundary, despite the 
fact that this seems to present a logical contradiction. The suspended 
body as the transcendence of boundaries makes it therefore the source of 
its own transcendence. The suspensions reflect the desire to explore the 
body as extended beyond the limitations of itself as boundary. 
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 Technological developments have contributed to the human 
experience of expanding the boundaries of its world. There tends to be a 
certain relational-loop between the body and technology. New technology 
generates new perceptions, and altered perceptions generate new 
technologies. Stelarc expresses the interrelationship interactions that 
emerge between the body and technological advancements. 
 
 Embracing evolving technology, Stelarc transforms the “obsolete” 
body by extending his body beyond it’s own capability by attaching 
technology to the body in the form of the robotic Third Hand. With the 
addition of this prosthesis, Stelarc challenges the body-technology 
relationship by transforming the suspended “bounded” body into a 
manipulator of technology. The vulnerable suspended body emerges as 
an extended technologised cyborg. This cyborg, a combination of 
machine and organism, regards the addition of the prosthesis, not as a 
substitution for a missing body part, but as an addition to its functioning 
capability. The boundaries of the organic mortal body are now extended 
with this prosthesis, into the world of technology. 
 
 Stelarc, by enabling the human body to embrace technology and 
thereby altering its physicality, demonstrates the relational-loop that exists 
between body and technology. In its own evolutionary process, 
technological developments have contributed to the human experience of 
expanding the boundaries of its world. Stelarc’s performance Split Body: 
Voltage In / Voltage Out (1995) (fig 7) demonstrates this body/technology 
interrelationship and shifts the cyborg from an autonomous bionic 
organic/mechanical construction into incorporating digital information as 
an integral component of its construction. Electricity was transduced by 
the body into organic movement and organic movement was transduced 
back into the mechanical Third Hand. Stelarc, using his body as 
transducer by relaying the force of electricity into, through, and outside the 
body, challenges its boundaries and makes the human body a source of 
technological intervention.  
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Living in an environment in which technology and electronics 
become an integral part of our existence has brought with it shifts in the 
way we experience the world. As informational pathways become central 
to the construction of the cyborg, they provide the cyborg with a source of 
technology that abolishes both space and time. In the performance Fractal 
Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance (1995) (fig 8), the 
networking of computers enables bodies in remote places to communicate 
intimately with one another. Connecting himself via electrodes into the 
dedicated World Wide Web, Stelarc’s performance is made up of the 
extension and projection of his inner nervous system outwards, via 
informational pathways, beyond the limitations of the body into a reactive 
loop with other bodies. This space of intense interaction and feedback 
which emerges between biological organisms and intelligent machines is 
evident in our daily experiences of electronically mediated mergings when 
we log on to the Internet, exchange e-mails, use our credit cards, and 
answer our cellphones. The organically constructed nervous system has 
extended itself beyond the confines of the biological body and 
experiences communicational possibilities previously unknown.  
  
As the Internet infrastructure rapidly extended itself globally, 
Stelarc in his performance of Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance 
(1996) (fig 10) demonstrates the effects of electronic technology on the 
organic body with no human intervention. This performance 
metaphorically shows how the human via informational technologies, 
emerges as posthuman into cyberspace. The Cartesian notion of 
separating the mind from the body, influences and allows for the 
transcendence of the material body through the medium of virtual reality. 
Virtual reality makes it possible for the immaterial “self” through technical 
interventions to enter and leave the world of cyberspace as a 
disembodied prosthesis. Technology has made it possible to leave the 
body behind and transcend beyond its corporeal limitations. 
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 The dynamic interplay that exists between technology and the body 
enables Stelarc to pursue the evolutionary performance of a “living” 
prosthesis. Stelarc performs Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11) using 
tissue engineering techniques. In Ping Body an Internet Actuated 
Performance (1996) (fig 10), information technology extended the nervous 
system into a “disembodied” virtual prosthesis. In contrast, Extra Ear ¼ 
Scale (2003) (fig 11) shows that living tissue can be grown, sustained and 
function outside the body, as an organic prosthesis. As the ear not only 
hears but is an organ of balance, Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 12) 
challenges the balance between technology and the body. It may appear 
that the digital fantasy of leaving the body behind to exist in a space 
where the material body is not needed may be possible, but this boundary 
is challenged by the fact that the material living body cannot be discarded. 
Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 12) indicates that no matter how much 
technology and the body enact on one another, the self cannot live 
without the body as a living entity and must always return to the “flesh” of 
the corporeal body.  
  
Contesting the Cartesian mind/body duality that has influenced the 
digital fantasy that the individual’s true nature can live free from the 
material body, reclaims the “obsolete” body. Stelarc’s utopian desire for 
bodily transcendence is belied by the evidence of his work. My contention 
is that Stelarc’s literal visceral performances and the obvious affective 
materiality of the body, contradict his rhetoric. The body refuses to 
disappear or to become obsolete as Stelarc claims but insistently remains 
the focal point of his performance. Stelarc’s artworks that leave the body 
suspended, extended, penetrated, shocked, in pain and bleeding, rather 
than question its obsolescence, question the body as corporeal, 
embodied, capable of feelings, suffering and anxious of its mortality. 
  
Stelarc’s Hollow Body / Host space: Stomach Sculpture (1993) (fig 
13) makes visible the obvious contradiction between Stelarc’s rhetoric and 
his factual artwork. Rather than being “hollow”, the body suffers a problem 
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with excess saliva. Viewing the gleaming stomach walls and its contents 
on a video screen displays the internal body as porous and enmeshed in 
the flesh of the world, not as a hollow construction that Stelarc wishes us 
to see.   
 
Mona Hatoum interrogates the body as corporeal, wet and mortal, 
questioning the boundaries between interior and exterior within the 
dualistic logic of the Cartesian thought that differentiates the body from 
the self. Hatoum, by merging interior and exterior, draws us through an 
identification with the flesh that points to the impossibility of identifying 
with the body as pure object which is transcendable. The body is seen as 
organic and mortal, exposing the vulnerability of human existence.  
 
Orlan, by having her skin peeled away from her body, emphasises 
our subordination to our body’s vulnerabilities and mortality. Rather than 
allowing us to gain control over our bodies, Orlan’s projects confuse the 
boundaries between interior and exterior, those boundaries that 
differentiate the body from the self within the dualistic logic of Cartesian 
thought. Hatoum and Orlan portray art as a performance that is premised 
on bodily knowledge that implicitly contradicts the mind/body duality and 
contradicts also Stelarc’s theory of transcendence.  
 
Theorists and researchers within the fields of philosophy, 
neuroscience, and AI have contested the logic of Cartesianism, the mind 
and body dualism that privileges the abstract and transcendent over the 
embodied and concrete. Reflecting Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental 
presumption, not of a Cartesian dualism of mind and body, but of their 
necessary interrelatedness, these theorists and researchers claim the 
importance of the body as central to our existence.  
 
Calling our attention to how important our bodies are in making 
sense of the world, Dreyfus gives examples of how, without bodily 
involvement and presence, we cannot acquire skills. He explains that 
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bodily coping skills and feelings are necessary to understand language 
and locate ourselves in space, and that aspects of imagination, perception 
and social interaction are central to the physical body. In addition, the 
facts Damasio presents about the interconnection between feelings and 
reason, and between brain and body proper, support his idea that the 
human is a whole integrated body and brain and that both participate in 
the interaction with the external environment.  
 
 The contradictions evident in Stelarc’s work point to the fact that, 
while Stelarc claims the body is obsolete, he manipulates the brute 
materiality of his own body as the medium for his artwork. He cannot do 
anything else but use his own body as the basis for his artwork. His body 
remains stubbornly suspended, extended, invaded whilst our 
understanding of Stelarc’s work shifts because of this body. The obstinate 
refusal of the corporeal body to disappear in Stelarc’s performances is 
aligned with the stubborn refusal of the corporeal body to fade into 
obsolescence.  
  
Stelarc’s artworks confirm the interrelational-loop that emerges 
between the body and technology. The body-technology interrelationship 
questions the changes evident between evolving technology and the 
body. Boundaries are crossed as the body emerges transformed through 
prosthesis, virtual reality or biotechnology. The body, though, can never 
be discarded and can never be regarded as obsolete. This is because the 
corporeal body with all its limitations is the stumbling block to the fantasy 
which Stelarc has of leaving his body behind and living as a disembodied 
mind in immortality. Stelarc’s living body exists to remind us, his viewers, 
of our own body/mind interconnectedness and our own mortal 
embeddedness within our surrounding world so that we understand that 
“to be a person, one needs to stand in relation to other bodies” (Stelarc 
quoted in Smith 2005b:216).  
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Appendix 1: Timeline of relevant artworks 
 
1972-1975: Sensory-deprivation events and body suspensions with 
harness, Japan, Australia (not illustrated). 
 
1976-1988: Body suspensions with insertions into the skin, Japan, 
Europe, United States, Australia: 
Event for Lateral Suspension (1978) (fig 1). 
Event for Inclined Suspension (1979) (fig 2). 
Seaside Suspension: Event for Wind and Waves (1981) (fig 3).  
Prepared Tree Suspension: Event for Obsolete Body, No.6 (1982) 
(fig 4). 
Street Suspension  (1984) (fig 5).  
Event for Stretched Skin / Third Hand (The Last Suspension) 
(1988) (fig 6). 
 
Hollow Body / Host Space: Stomach Sculpture (1993) (fig 13 and fig 14). 
 
Split Body: Voltage In / Voltage Out (1995) (fig 7). 
 
Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance (1995) (fig 8).  
 
Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996) (fig 9 and fig 10). 
 
Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003) (fig 11 and fig 12).  
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Illustrations 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Stelarc, Event for Lateral Suspension (1978). 
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Fig 2. Stelarc, Event for Inclined Suspension (1979). 
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Fig 3. Stelarc, Seaside Suspension: Event for Wind and Waves (1981). 
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Fig 4. Stelarc, Prepared Tree Suspension: Event for Obsolete Body, No.6 (1982). 
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Fig 5. Stelarc, Street Suspension (1984). 
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Fig 6. Stelarc, Event for Stretched Skin / Third Hand (The Last Suspension) (1988). 
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Fig 7. Stelarc, Split Body: Voltage In / Voltage Out  (1996). 
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Fig 8. Stelarc, Muscle Stimulation System (1995). The system is a component of the 
Fractal Flesh, an Internet Body Upload Performance. 
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Fig 9. Stelarc, Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996). 
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Fig 10. Stelarc, Ping Body an Internet Actuated Performance (1996).  
Video frames taken during the performance and uploaded to the internet. 
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Fig 11. Stelarc, Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2003). 
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Fig 12. Stelarc, Ear on an Arm Visualization (2003). 
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Fig 13. Stelarc, Stomach Sculpture (1993). 
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Fig 14. Stelarc, Microfilm image of the inside of the artist’s stomach (1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
